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Since its introduction to Scotland, the system of alternatives to prosecution has grown 
significantly both in terms of use and in the widening of available alternative measures.  
Despite this, there has been very little research carried out on alternative measures in 
Scotland.  
What will follow is a comparative study of the Scottish system with the system of the 
Netherlands.   Prior to recent changes, the Netherlands’ system operated a model similar to 
that of Scotland but now operates a significantly more comprehensive range of alternatives 
to court prosecutions. 
It is concluded that alternatives to prosecution are imperative in a rounded justice system, 
but there are areas of development that may be feasible to improve the system in Scotland.  
In addition, recommendations are made for such improvements to the current system in 
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Introduction   
Since the introduction of alternatives to prosecution to the Scottish criminal justice system 
in 1988, there has been significant use of such alternatives as well as several variations of 
the type available for use by the public prosecutor in Scotland.   Although there have been 
two significant Government reviews considering the introduction and development of 
alternatives to prosecution in Scotland (the Stewart Committee in 1977 and the McInnes 
Committee in 2004), there exists a notable absence of independent comparative or 
qualitative research conducted into the use, type, and nature of alternative disposals in 
Scotland.1  
This research was undertaken for the purposes of understanding the development, use and 
system of the alternative disposals in the criminal justice system, understanding any 
improvements which could be made to the Scottish system, whilst maintaining the integrity 
of the process and protection of the actors within the system. 
The researcher examines the use, type, and nature of alternative disposals in Scotland.  It 
compares and contrasts these with the alternatives to prosecution under the system in the 
Netherlands.  Although comparative studies of European prosecution systems have 
previously been undertaken, notably Leigh and Hall William’s study of the systems in the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark, they have not considered the prosecutor’s role in the 
sentencing of offenders via alternatives to prosecution.2 
Scotland introduced the ‘fiscal fine’ in 1988 at a maximum sum of £25.00, rising to £300 
by 2007.3 Since then, Scotland has further developed the alternative to prosecution system 
to include work orders, compensation orders and combined fiscal fine and work orders.    
Indeed, over the last 50 years, the systems of alternatives to prosecution in both the 
Netherlands and Scotland have developed significantly.  However, the jurisdictions have 
taken significantly different pathways in the range of powers available to the public 
 
1 Julia Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A Comparative Study (Clarendon Press 1995). Fionda 
undertakes comparative research between Scotland, Netherlands, Germany and in England and Wales, 
however this research expressly considers how the system operates, rather than the operation of the system 
per se. 
2 Leonard Herschel Leigh and John Eryl Hall Williams, The Management of the Prosecution Process in 
Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands (James Hall 1981). 
3 The Coronavirus No 2 (Scotland) Act 2020 has temporarily increased this amount to £500: The impact of 
this temporary rise is not considered within this research, as the change was made during the writing phase of 




prosecutor.   The Netherlands' system was chosen for comparative research due to the 
differences in the range of the alternatives from those in Scotland.  This enables the 
research to be formed from a consideration of different developments and to consider the 
impact, to examine the system's use, and then to consider what developments may be 
possible in Scotland. 
The Scottish criminal law system is traditionally viewed as adversarial.  The state conducts 
criminal cases before a judge or a judge and jury.4  The judge and/or jury is master of the 
facts and the law and determines or otherwise the accused's guilt.5  The Netherlands is a 
‘moderately adversarial’ or ‘moderately inquisitorial’ system.  This system involves a 
judge and the prosecutor in investigating the “truth” of any criminal behaviour.6 
This research explores both the Scottish and Dutch system of alternatives to prosecution 
with a critical examination of the Scottish system as it currently operates.  
Recommendations of potential developments to the Scots system are made and, by 
implication, aspects of the Netherlands' system are rejected. 
This research presents results from a statistical analysis undertaken to understand the 
prevalence of the alternatives to prosecution in each jurisdiction, with specific inquiries 
about the operation of the particular alternatives in relation to the nature of the offences.  It 
was anticipated that a direct examination of the jurisdictions' data would allow for direct 
comparative conclusions.  The limitations of the comparison are discussed further in 
Chapter 1. 
A literature review was undertaken to examine previous enquiries and the establishment of 
alternatives in each jurisdiction. This ensured a fuller understanding of the prevailing 
circumstances in the jurisdictions.  The review enabled the statistical analysis to be 
underpinned by knowledge of the jurisdictions' circumstances during the developments.  
The literature review is incorporated throughout the research. 
 
4 In a jury trial (Solemn proceedings), the jury are the masters of the facts and the Judge being the master of 
the law.  In summary proceedings, the Sheriff is the master of the law and the facts. 
5 See Timothy H Jones and Ian Taggart, Criminal Law (6th edn, W Green 2015).   There have been 
suggestions that Scotland has been developing more towards an inquisitorial style in summary criminal 
matters, see Chapter 6.3. 
6 Marianne FH Hirsch Ballin, Anticipative Criminal Investigation: Theory and Counterterrorism Practice in 




Whilst it has been possible to make a variety of recommendations for further consideration 
it is not anticipated that the recommendations in this research will be adopted in the format 
suggested.  This research acknowledges and presents potential developments that, with 
further study and detailed quantitative and qualitative research, may frame and inform any 
implementation of this research's recommendations. The researcher also recognises 
criticisms regarding the import of one jurisdiction’s response to criminal behaviour into 
another jurisdiction: 
Direct transplants from foreign legal systems have often been criticised on two 
distinct grounds.  In the first place, a transplant of a legal rule may prove 
inappropriate because of the different social and economic structures of the two 
societies…A second objection to transplants of legal rules insists that legal 
concepts fit into clusters of concepts which together comprise a coherent and 
consistent set of rules and principles for the regulation of some aspect of social 
life.  One cannot transplant a single foreign concept into domestic law without 
undermining the coherence of its conceptual scheme, which ultimately causes 
confusion and inconsistency.7 
Throughout this research, the researcher uses the term “victim” when referring to the 
complainer of the criminal action to the police and subsequently named as the complainer 
in the criminal action in Scotland.  The term is not used in a prejudicial manner or to elicit 
an attribution of guilt against an accused person. The term is used as all persons in the 
statistical data have had a punishment imposed and not chosen to challenge the imposition 
of the alternative to prosecution.  
The term “accused” is used through this research for simplicity in referring to the person 
given an alternative disposal to prosecution.  There are various stages in which a person 
transitions from being accused of the criminal offence then accepting the alternative and in 
the Netherlands is “convicted”. The term accused is not used to imply, or elicit a sense, 
that the person was guilty or not guilty of the offence, but merely to refer to their status in 
the justice system. 
 





The Scottish system, at times, refers to direct measures, referring to the public prosecutor 
taking direct action against an accused person.  For the sake of consistency and comparison 
between the two countries, the term ‘alternative to prosecution’ is used throughout the 
research.  Furthermore, it is arguable that some aspects of the system in the Netherlands 
are prosecution outwith a court setting.  For the purposes of this research, all prosecutor-
imposed disposals are referred to as alternatives to prosecution.8 
Within Scotland there is a schema called “Diversion from Prosecution”.  This scheme is a 
system which enables the public prosecutor to refer a case directly to social work or 
partner agencies whereby the public prosecutor assesses that diversion from prosecution is 
in the public interest. Any decision to make a diversion from prosecution results in 
prosecutorial action is delayed until around three months after the commencement of this 
diversion.  In some circumstances the decision to divert from prosecution comes with a 
waiver from prosecution subject to successful completion of the diversion.  This thesis 
does not include an examination of the diversion from prosecution, but considers only 
alternatives to prosecution, commonly called in Scotland ‘Direct Measures’, whereby a 
criminal sanction is imposed upon an accused person directly by the public prosecutor. 
In Chapter 1, the methodological approach undertaken is set out. Consideration is given to 
the researcher's reflexivity in conducting this research, the philosophical and ontological 
implications which this had on the research and how these were mitigated.  The 
comparative models’ strengths and weaknesses are examined, alongside the statistical 
analysis approach and the attempts undertaken by the researcher to gain further insight 
using statutory enquiry methods of public bodies in Scotland.  The methodologies chapter 
is included in the interests of an open and transparent understanding of the research, the 
limitations in its process, and how the method helped explore the alternative disposal 
systems in both jurisdictions. 
The public prosecutor's role in Scotland is examined in Chapter 2, in order to better 
illuminate the role which the public prosecutor in Scotland has in the criminal justice 
system and how the public prosecutor operates within that framework.  The historical 
position and the development of the alternatives are set out to frame the Scottish system's 
development and the arguments promulgated in Scotland both for and against the 
 
8 See Community Justice Scotland: https://communityjustice.scot/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Diversion-




introduction of the system of alternatives.  Each alternative is explored as to the limits of 
the power and the current prevalence of each alternative.  This chapter frames the research 
from the Scottish perspective and allows for an understanding to be gained prior to 
drawing comparisons between each jurisdiction. 
In Chapter 3, the researcher examines the system of the Netherlands.  The researcher 
examines the prosecution system, the prosecutor's role, and the historical development of 
the system.  The mechanisms of alternatives to prosecution are explored and the prevalence 
of each alternative is examined. This chapter frames the research and allows for an 
understanding to be gained prior to drawing comparisons between each jurisdiction. 
Building on the context of both jurisdictions, Chapter 4 considers the Dutch case-marking 
system.  This chapter draws on a statistical analysis of the Scottish criminal justice 
system’s operation of the alternative disposals, given its human case marking methodology 
and questions the consistency in offering an alternative to prosecution in Scotland.  This 
chapter raises questions about the process, the transparency of the Scottish system and the 
economic impact of alternatives.  The researcher highlights areas for development in the 
Scottish system. 
In Chapter 5, the researcher considers the role and position of the victim in both 
jurisdictions.  This chapter identifies Scotland's opportunity to further explore how the 
victim is recognised and engaged within the criminal justice system.  This potential area 
for development, discovered during this research, forms a key recommendation in Chapter 
7.  
The models of criminal justice in which Scotland operates are examined within Chapter 6. 
The nature of the system of criminal justice as impacted by the introduction of alternatives 
to prosecution will be considered. 
Chapter 7 concludes this research.  The researcher draws conclusions and sets out 
recommendations for further research before developing Scotland's system. These 
recommendations enable further reflection on the Scottish criminal justice system.   
This research is a singular comparative study. It represents a starting point for a fuller 




system are considered for implementation in Scotland, they must be evidence-based, viable 
and for the benefit of the publicly funded criminal justice system. 
This research presents an opportunity to consider the Scottish system and changes that may 
be considered for implementation to improve the system.   The purpose of this research is 
not to establish the elements of the system operating in the Netherlands for export into the 
Scottish system, but to illustrate what learnings can be taken from another system of 
alternative disposals and how, potentially, the Scottish system can develop from the 





Chapter 1: Research Methodologies 
This chapter outlines the research methodologies of the research.  The researcher sets out 
their reflexivity and how its impact was mitigated throughout. The comparative approach 
undertaken, approaches to statistical collection, analysis and the limitations imposed upon 
the research are all outlined and considered. 
The chapter is included so that this research is presented in an open and transparent 
manner.  The researcher further acknowledges the limitations and need for further research 
beyond the scope of this research. 
1.1 The Researcher’s Reflexivity 
Rice and Essy suggest that researchers should undertake thematic analysis having taken a 
passive stance rather than by hypotheses or being impacted by their own assumptions. 9   In 
the researcher’s view, this is unrealistic as no research takes place in a silo and fails to be 
impacted by the researcher's ontological, epistemological, and perhaps even metaphysical 
standpoint.  What can be achieved is to limit the impact this has and effectively mitigate it 
as the research develops.10 
When I initially approached the task of examining the research question, I can now admit 
that I made errors.  I had come to the law as a mature student, undertaking the LLB and 
DPLP in the only university (Robert Gordon University) to offer both of these programs 
entirely online and with international students from various jurisdictions with the majority 
being full time working professionals studying part-time.  Nevertheless, I still had the 
idealism generally associated with youth and despite being a pragmatist in my business 
life, became an idealist for the law and its implementation in criminal practice.  
I read of alternative disposals in Scotland while studying for the Diploma in Professional 
Legal Practice. Initially I felt contempt for them, at least from a limited understanding of 
their use and at best from a legal purist perspective.  I came to this research with this 
background but after months of reading, studying, challenging and personal growth 
 
9 Pranee Liamputtong Rice and Douglas Ezzy, Qualitative Research Methods: A Health Focus (Oxford 
University Press 1999). 
10 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, ‘Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology’ (2006) 3 Qualitative 




through this research, do I still feel contempt for them? No.  Did it hinder my early reading 
and research? Yes.  Did I have to re-do significant parts of work and re-reading of 
materials once I became consciously aware of the limitations I, as the researcher, had 
imposed? Yes, I did.  During the research, did I become an avid supporter of Alternative 
Disposals in Scotland? No, I did not.  I became an academic lawyer with a passion for the 
Scottish criminal justice system, who seeks balanced but advantageous developments in 
Scotland. 
The last paragraph may have seemed like a personal exploration of my journey during this 
research, and to an extent it is. It is fundamentally at the core of the conclusions and 
recommendations of this research. It is a reflective statement which acknowledges the 
unconscious bias and the impact that this could have had on this research.  If bias is not 
acutely monitored and challenged, it undermines the independence of thought and analysis 
of data required in research.11  A failure to challenge a researcher’s own bias, be it 
conscious or sub-conscious, leads to research which is not rigorous and fails to stand the 
test of time or scrutiny.  The effects of the researcher’s impact on this research have been 
mitigated throughout.  As suggested by Fook, it is essential that a researcher not only 
becomes aware of the impact that they have on the research but fundamentally challenges 
their domination of the research question to “challenge unexamined assumptions inherent 
in her or his own thinking.”12 
Reflexivity allows the researcher to challenge themselves and develop their hypothesis and 
ultimately leads to a more balanced and discerned thesis.   
The researcher’s positionality/ies does not exist independently of the research 
process nor does it completely determine the latter. Instead, this must be seen 
as a dialogue – challenging perspectives and assumptions both about the social 
world and of the researcher him/herself. This enriches the research process and 
its outcomes.13 
 
11 Robert J MacCoun, ‘Biases in the Interpretation and Use of Research Results’ (1998) 49 Annual Review of 
Psychology 259. 
12 Jan Fook, ‘Reflexivity as Method’ (1999) 9 Annual Review of Health Social Science 11. 
13 Erlinda C Palaganas et al, ‘The Qualitative Report Reflexivity in Qualitative Research’ (2017) 22 The 




Alternative disposals in the Scottish justice system serve a vital function in our criminal 
justice system without which the costs, the time delays, the care of the victims, witnesses 
and accused, would all be inferior to the present circumstances.  This reality does not mean 
that we cannot improve the system in Scotland.  This research was undertaken for the 
purposes of understanding the development, use and system of the alternative disposals in 
the criminal justice system, understanding any improvements which could be made to the 
Scottish system, whilst maintaining the integrity of the process and protection of the actors 
within the system. 
As indicated in the introduction to this thesis the Netherlands was selected as a comparator 
due to the wide range of alternatives to prosecution and the period of time which 
alternatives have operated within the Dutch criminal law system.  The writer, whilst not 
being fluent in Dutch, has been able to circumvent difficulties in language due to the 
ability of the Dutch office of national statistics providing information in English and 
Dutch, alongside an explanation of each term and its use. Due to the wide dual language in 
Dutch academia a review of relevant materials was substantively possible. 
During the research, informal discussions took place with both academics and 
practitioners. These were unstructured discussions to garnish thoughts and gain insight into 
practices which might be examined in this research.  Often, practitioners merely expressed 
an interest in what was being researched and offered their unsolicited views on the system 
or practices in the Scottish criminal justice system.  These conversations did not form part 
of the research and nor is anecdotal evidence considered in this research.  However, it did 
prove fruitful for understanding areas for examination and exploration, even if for future 
research. Particular applications of the current system were checked with practitioners for 
confirmation, or otherwise, that descriptions and matters of procedure contained within this 
research are accurate at the time of writing. 
Sarat and Sibley suggest that the researcher must be wary of the “pull of policy” in 
research, highlighting that orientating research at government policymakers may 
undermine the objectivity of the research in and of itself. 14 This research has not been 
designed or conducted with the policymakers’ mind-set in active consciousness but from 
the researcher’s interest in the topic and a developing desire to see the criminal justice 
 




system in Scotland become more balanced and seek solutions to ever-challenging 
circumstances.   The comparisons and analysis undertaken in this research were not to 
prove or disprove a hypothesis. Instead, the data was analysed, with matters for further 
investigation studied and considered. 
This research was anticipated to be simple and straightforward: compare and contrast each 
of the methods; examine the strengths and weaknesses of each system; produce results and 
recommendations. Unfortunately, that was not the case, and acknowledgement must be 
given to the issues which arose during the research period and indeed the brief comparison 
made between the data and engagement of the public bodies in each jurisdiction.15  This 
research was not subject to ethical review as the data used was publicly available and did 
not fall into the categories whereby ethical approval was required. 
1.2 Comparative Research 
Comparative research, in a legal context, provides significant insight when done in 
reflective context.  It allows for a deeper understanding of our society and the socio-legal 
impact. Comparative research permits an examination of our culture, context and system of 
operation against another.  It allows conclusions to be drawn as to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the systems involved in the comparison.   
Comparative analysis enhances the understanding of one’s own society by 
placing its familiar structures and routines against those of other systems 
(understanding); comparison heightens our awareness of other systems, 
cultures, and patterns of thinking and acting, thereby casting a fresh light on 
our own political communication arrangements and enabling us to contrast 
them critically with those prevalent in other countries (awareness); comparison 
allows for the testing of theories across diverse settings and for the evaluating 
of the scope and significance of certain phenomena, thereby contributing to the 
development of universally applicable theory (generalization); comparison 
prevents scholars from over-generalizing based on their own, often 
idiosyncratic, experiences and challenges, claims to ethnocentrism or naïve 
universalism (relativization); and comparison provides access to a wide range 
 




of alternative options and problem solutions that can facilitate or reveal a way 
out of similar dilemmas at home (alternatives).16 
Comparative study prevents research from an over generalisation of the particular theory or 
the application of naïve universalisms to a preference of a particular system.  Comparative 
research provides access to alternative options and considerations, which facilitates the 
development of ideas and solutions to similar issues. 
Comparative research guides our attention to the explanatory relevance of the 
contextual environment for communication outcomes and aims to understand 
how the systemic context shapes communication phenomena differently in 
different settings. The research is based on the assumption that different 
parameters of political and media systems differentially promote or constrain 
communication roles and behaviours of organizations and actors within those 
systems.17 
This research is naturally limited by the constraints of comparative research. However, 
comparison is a mode of scientific analysis that sets out to investigate 
systematically two or more entities in respect to their similarities and differences, 
to arrive at understanding, explanation and further conclusions.18  
In acknowledging the weaknesses of a comparative study, we face the reality of the 
research.  
This research seeks to overcome the limitations of, or at least mitigate where possible, the 
comparative methodology by acknowledging areas where further research is required and 
not merely suggesting a fait accompli. The researcher has not allowed comparisons to be 
drawn where there is a lack of data available from one or other of the systems, but 
highlighted the gap, to effectively mitigate any construct bias.  
 
16 Frank Esser and Rens Vliegenthart, ‘Comparative Research Methods’ (2017) The International 
Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods 1 - 22 at 2 . 
17 ibid. 




1.3 Statistical Analysis 
The comparison of statistics between jurisdictions brings inherent limitations by the very 
fact that jurisdictions vary in their collection and storage of data, their differential 
jurisdictional structure, methodology of collection, and the differences in the criminal law 
processes. The datasets analysed in this data naturally contained these limitations, the 
effects of which are mitigated where possible.19 
In the analysis, the researcher initially set out on a path of examining the prevalence of the 
alternatives to prosecution in each jurisdiction.  Upon understanding the use of each 
alternative, an examination of the methodology, the facts and circumstances against the 
criteria for the use of alternatives to prosecution was expected.  An examination of the 
prevalence of alternatives according to the stereotypical gender markers was undertaken.  
This examination was to consider any variation and understand the causation and 
justification of a variation where it existed.  The same process was expected regarding the 
ethnicity of accused persons.  
Once the prevalence of an alternatives system was understood, research was undertaken 
into the economic value of the alternatives system in Scotland. The purpose of this was to 
test the arguments, discovered in the literature review, that alternatives represented a 
significant saving to the public purse in Scotland.  The research examines the potential 
future savings to the public purse in Scotland should the system be further developed. 
It was anticipated that a direct comparison from the data would have allowed conclusions 
to be drawn as to the potential effects of introducing a system to Scotland.  It has only been 
possible to partially complete this task in this research. 
The Scottish Government official Criminal Proceedings in Scotland bulletins provide the 
beginnings of research into the criminal justice system in Scotland; these published figures 
give generic insights into the overall trends in the criminal justice system in Scotland but 
do not allow for any detailed analysis.20   
 
19 See Anna Alvazzi Del Frate, ‘Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics Challenges’ (2010) International 
Statistics on Crime and Justice 167. 




Having been unable to draw conclusions from the published data, detailed statutory 
requests were submitted to the responsible public bodies to seek this information.  The 
results of these requests are reviewed in 1.3.1. The lack of available statistics, in several 
areas, led to a change in the expected outcomes of this research, it became necessary to 
make recommendations for further research into the data and developments of the Scottish 
data system. 
1.3.1 Additional Data Requests 
Requests under the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, were made to the Crown 
Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) in August 2020, in an attempt to research 
the data. The response stated: 
The COPFS case management database is a live, operating database.  It is 
designed to meet our business needs in relation to the processing of criminal 
cases, and the information within it is structured accordingly.  We do not have 
a separate statistical database and hold only operational data needed for 
business purposes….In order to identify the information requested, Crown 
Office staff would be required to consider individually each report submitted in 
relation to the request and the time taken to complete this task would exceed 
the upper cost limit.21  
COPFS, in numerous requests, were unable to provide the data to allow a full analysis 
of the alternative disposals systems in Scotland, although partial data was made 
available via the Scottish Government.  The gaps and lack of available statistical 
analysis available from COPFS highlights an area for development to ensure that 
strategy and policy are developed in a manner which is evidence-based and effective.22  
The lack of primary sourced information within COPFS and examination of the 
 
21 Freedom of Information Response from COPFS, upper cost limit is £600. 
22 The significant question concerning this lack of data is whether we should be concerned at all by this, 
indeed it may be suggested that alternatives to prosecution are mostly used in cases concerning mala 
prohibita rather than offences which are malum in se.  We cannot substantiate that claim in of itself. Indeed, 
from the data available publicly we know that recorded police warnings have been used nine times for sexual 
offences and that the fiscal fine has been used five times to dispose of sexual offences. See R.M. White, “Out 




statistical trends within COPFS is a cause for concern which is explored within Chapter 
4 of this research. 
Further responses were received from the Scottish Government in response to the 
information requested.  The Scottish government did not refuse to provide any information 
held due to the £600 limit, and refusals only occurred where the data was not collected or 
held by them. 
1.3.2 The Netherlands’ Data 
The data position in Scotland is to be contrasted by the approach in the Netherlands, where 
an open-source data enquiry site is available, which allows researchers to query all data 
available from the criminal justice system directly.23 Researchers can apply multiple date 
and data filters to the data and create source data tables for particular enquiries.  The 
researcher contacted the Office of National Statistics in the Netherlands for more specific 
information via email, and this was provided within 48 working hours via a direct link to 
the open data source where the query criteria had been created for this research.  The 
provision of the information in English, allowed for direct comparisons to be made 
between the nature of alternatives being used and the frequency, without first relying on 
translation services.24 
1.3.3 Conclusion 
This research, the methodological approach and the challenges encountered required the 
researcher to be flexible in approach to maintain the integrity of this research.  In the 
researcher’s view the research provides a significant insight into the type, use and 
operation of the alternatives to prosecution system in Scotland and provides a 
commencement point for future research to further improve the criminal justice system in 
Scotland.  
 
23 Data from the Netherlands can be queried in an annualised format not with live data. 
24 The researcher requested the information in English, the Dutch authorities provided the information in both 
English and Dutch. The information was provided via a hyperlink into the Dutch criminal justice system 
where the data had been provided with the open and adjustable filters enabling the subset to be interrogated 




Chapter 2: The Role of the Prosecutor and the System of Alternatives in Scotland 
This chapter considers the historical background, the role of the public prosecutor in 
Scotland and the context of the development of the alternatives. It notes the objections and 
findings from the Stewart Committee and the McInnes Committee and their role in the 
creation of and the furtherance of the alternatives system.  The chapter concludes with an 
outline of the available alternatives in Scotland detailing the limitations which apply to 
their use. 
2.1 The Prosecution System in Scotland 
In Scotland, offences are prosecuted at the sole discretion of the Lord Advocate,25 acting 
through an Advocate Depute in the most serious offences and through Procurators’ Fiscal 
and their deputes in less serious offences.  COPFS has absolute discretion in determining 
how to act or proceed in any matter which is reported to them or indeed any investigations 
they wish to make into a crime.26 The Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1876 established the 
role of the public prosecutor.27 
The Lord Advocate is the Dominus Litis and master of the instance in Scots Law.28  The 
Police Service is not required to report every instance of potential criminality to COPFS. 29  
It is not uncommon for COPFS to direct the police not to report particular criminal 
offences or to issue an informal warning or, where applicable, to issue a fixed penalty 
notice.30 COPFS are not required by statute to prosecute every criminal offence reported to 
them where there is a sufficiency of evidence that a crime has been committed.  The 
 
25 The first significant step towards this position in Scotland, occurred through an Act of Parliament in 1587 
CAP. 77 and by the 1700s any person wishing to bring a private prosecution required the consent of the Lord 
Advocate see Wilfred Guild Normand, ‘The Public Prosecutor in Scotland’ (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review. 
at 345 
26 COPFS is also responsible for the investigation of sudden deaths and fatal accident inquiries.   This aspect 
of their role is not considered in this research. 
27 It has been suggested that this role in a practical sense had been devolved from Sheriffs much earlier than 
this see: Susan Moody and Jacqueline Tombs, Prosecution in the Public Interest (Scottish Academic Press 
1982). 
28 There are exceptions to this, but they are so limited it is unnecessary to consider them here.  Private 
prosecutions in Scotland are technically still possible but given their extreme rarity the subject of this 
research is not impacted by not considering them – See Further: Neil Gow, ‘Private Prosecutions’ (1995) 
Criminal Law Bulletin 6. 
29 An investigation may also be undertaken by another appointed body such has The Health and Safety 
Executive. 




Prosecution Code is a non-statutory code issued by the Lord Advocate.  The code outlines 
the considerations which a prosecutor considers when deciding, how or if, to proceed with 
a criminal complaint. 
The two-stage process is outlined by COPFS as follows:  firstly, to establish whether there 
is “sufficient admissible, reliable and credible evidence of a crime committed by the 
accused.”31  Once the first test is satisfied, the prosecutor will apply the “public interest 
test” and only prosecute where it is in the public interest to do so.32 
The public interest test is not simple or straightforward.  In reaching a conclusion on the 
public interest test, the prosecutor is required to apply their mind to the thirteen factors 
which require to be considered and these are listed in the Prosecution Code as follows:  
 nature and gravity of the offence;  
 impact of the offence on the victim and other witnesses;  
 age, background and personal circumstances of the accused; 
 age and personal circumstances of the victim and other witnesses;  
 the attitude of the victim;  
 the motive for the crime;  
 age of the offence; 
 mitigating circumstances;  
 effect of prosecution on the accused;  
 risk of further offending;  
 
31 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, ‘Prosecution Code’ (Crown Office 2001). 




 availability of a more appropriate civil remedy; 
 powers of the court; and  
 public concern.33   
The Summary Justice Reform Thematic Report on the Use of Fiscal Fines 34 highlighted 
the objections made to alternatives being used, the primary objection being that the COPFS 
would be both the prosecutor and judge/sentencer.35  In addition, concerns in Scotland 
have been raised at the lack of external supervision, control and quality management of 
COPFS.36  There have been significant criticisms of the decision-making process used by 
each depute and the variation between deputes, particularly in respect of the wide variation 
between different locales in Scotland.37   
Prior to 2007, there was no statutory independent oversight, inspection or evaluation in 
Scotland of the Prosecution Service. In 2007, the role of the Inspectorate of Prosecution in 
Scotland was given statutory status. 38  The role of the Inspectorate of Prosecution in 
Scotland is to arrange the inspection of the COPFS and report to the Lord Advocate on its 
findings.  The inspectorate will seek to make recommendations to the Lord Advocate, 
which shall lead to improvements in COPFS.  The issues of oversight and consistency are 
further explored in Chapter 4. 
There have been significant developments over the last 15 years in respect of the rights of 




33 ibid, at 6-8. 
34 Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland, ‘Summary Justice Reform: Thematic Report on the Use of Fiscal 
Fines’ (2009). 
35 ibid. at 10. 
36 See: Peter Duff and Neil Hutton, Criminal Justice in Scotland (Ashgate 1999), at 126. 
37 The Scottish Parliament (n 29). 




Wherever possible, victims and next-of-kin who request it are now provided 
with an explanation for the decision to take no proceedings.  Alternatively, 
where proceedings have been commenced, an explanation of the decision to 
discontinue proceedings or to accept a plea to a lesser charge can be 
explained.39 
From the 1st of July 2015, a statutory right to review a decision by COPFS not to prosecute 
was introduced.40 Where an accused has been informed of no further action, a renunciation 
of the right to prosecute is irrevocable.41 Significantly, there is no right of review whereby 
an alternative to prosecution has been offered.42 Chapter 5 considers the role of the victim 
in the alternatives to prosecution system. 
Fionda43 highlights a significant issue relevant to the Scottish system: that prosecutors are 
not required to give reasons for their decisions. Whilst the right to review has been 
introduced in Scotland, since Fionda’s research, this has had a limited impact on the public’s 
understanding of the prosecution system. This lack of public understanding of the 
prosecutorial system in Scotland serves to undermine the public’s trust in a system that they 
do not understand.44  
2.2 Development of Alternative Disposals in Scotland 
In the 21st century, Scots law fundamentally changed its approach to the criminal system of 
the State prosecuting individuals in the public interest.  These developments include the 
systems of alternatives to prosecution, plea bargaining/charge bargaining and sentence 
discounts for the accused person tendering a plea prior to a trial.45 
 
39 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, ‘COPFS Annual Report 2003 - 2004’ (2004), at 6. 
40 The Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014 at S4. 
41 Thom v HM Advocate [1976] J.C. 48. 
42 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, ‘Lord Advocate’s Rules: Review of a Decision Not to 
Prosecute - Section 4 of the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014’ (2015). 
43 Fionda (n 1), at 211. 
44 Hazel Croall, Gerry Mooney and Mary Munro, ‘Crime, Justice and Society in Scotland’ [2016] Crime, 





The historical position, at least in case law, was that there should be no advantage to an 
accused in the early adoption of a guilty plea and this was to be actively discouraged.  In 
Strawthorn v McLeod46 the court stated that: 
In this country, there is the presumption of innocence, and an accused person is 
entitled to go to trial and leave the Crown to establish his guilt if the Crown 
can.  It is wrong therefore that an accused person should be put in a position of 
realising that if he pleads guilty early enough, he will receive a lower sentence 
than he otherwise would receive for the offence.47 
The jurisprudence in Scotland has significantly changed this position whereby sentencing 
discounting has become a significant feature of the early guilty plea in Scots law.48  
Moreover, it has been suggested that the accused who accepts an alternative to prosecution 
receives a “double discount” by both a reduced sentence and avoiding a formal 
conviction.49 
Whilst the discussion and use of alternative disposals with the prosecutor imposing a 
“sentence” on an accused is likely to present issues to the legal purist, it is the case that the 
prosecutor has been involved in sentencing in Scotland since the very creation of COPFS. 
Indeed, White states that the conditional offer “is punishment without prosecution and 
constitutes a highly institutionalised plea bargain, removing protections from the guilty, 
transferring enormous but unaccountable power to the Crown Office.”50 The reality is that 
COPFS drafts the charge the accused faces; can amend the charge and detail before and 
during the trial;51 chooses the type of prosecution the accused is to face and decides the 
trial's forum.52  All of these matters directly impact the sentence which may be imposed on 
the accused. 
 
46 Strawthorn v McLeod [1987] S.C.C.R 413. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See – 1995 Act S.196; see Du Plooy v HM Advocate, 2005, 1 JC at Para 7.  For Further discussion on 
sentence discounting and plea bargaining see: Cyrus Tata and Jay M Gormley, ‘Sentencing and Plea 
Bargaining’ (2016) 1 Oxford Handbooks Online 1. 
49 The Scottish Parliament (n 29), at 11.49 
50 R.M. White, “‘Decriminalisation’? A pernicious hypocrisy?” (2009) 13 Edin LR 108. 
51 See the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act (1995) 1995. Ss 96 & 159. 
52 Particular offences are reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court of Justiciary, these offences 




2.3 The Stewart Committee 
In 1988, the first alternative to prosecution was introduced to Scotland in the form of a 
fiscal fine. The Stewart Committee was established in 1977 with a remit to consider and 
study alternatives to prosecution.  This remit was a direct attempt to understand what 
levers could be used to reduce the number of offenders being processed through the court 
system.  The Stewart Committee published two reports, the first recommending the 
widening of the powers to issue fixed penalty notices for traffic offences53 and the second 
considered the introduction of various alternatives to divert offenders from prosecution for 
a range of statutory and common law offences.54 The Committee concluded that due to the 
nature of the Scottish prosecution service, the measures which they proposed could be 
introduced causing little disruption to the functioning of the criminal justice system. 
The Stewart Committee recommended the introduction of the ‘fiscal fine’ by a majority. 
The minority were distinctly against the introduction of alternatives.   Furthermore, 
respondents to the Committee’s call for evidence raised significant objections to the 
alternative measures, including the chair of the Committee, the Law Society of Scotland, 
The Sheriffs’ Association and the Scottish Council for Civil Liberties.  The minority 
argued that the basis for proceeding was based on a fundamental misjudgement of applying 
a system used in European countries with an inquisitorial system of prosecution and could 
not be said to apply in the Scottish adversarial system.  The robust rejection by the 
minority alleged that the system would leave the independent prosecutors as a “surrogate 
judge”55 with the Sheriffs’ Association suggesting that it would question the judicial role 
of determining guilt and imposing the punishment on the offender.56 
The majority were of the view that they needed to deal with the problems in the criminal 
justice system without being stuck in a philosophical mindset which failed to adequately 
deal with the issues the justice system faced.  The majority stated: “The delays which are 
 
53 Stewart Commitee, ‘The Motorist and Fixed Penalties, 1st Report, Cmnd. 8027’. 
54 Lord Stewart, Keeping Offenders out of Court: Further Alternatives to Prosecution: Second Report of the 
Committee on Alternatives to Prosecution Appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Lord 
Advocate, vol 8958 (HMSO 1983). 
55 ibid.Para 4.39. 




evident in the system may cause more difficulty and inconvenience for the offender and 
more concern to him than any niceties of the philosophy of justice.”57 
Despite the minority view, Lord Stewart expressed, “one of the primary duties of the State 
is to provide and maintain a system of law and order which in our view should be founded 
upon the principle of independent judicial determination not only of guilt … but of 
punishment of offenders.”58  The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act59 introduced the system 
of the fiscal fine, limited at the time to the sum of £25. Fiscal fines first operated on the 
basis that the fine, or at least the first instalment of the fine, must be paid within 28 days to 
be deemed as accepted.   Providing this occurred, no criminal proceedings were permitted 
to follow.60 By 1991, the use of the fiscal fine had reached a rate of 4.2% of all reported 
criminal offences and bypassing the use of fiscal warning letters at 3.8%.61  In the period 
between the introduction of the fiscal fine to 1991 there was a significant drop in the 
prosecution rate from 92% in 1982 to 53%.62 
The level of the fiscal fine was amended in 1996 to introduce four levels: £25; £50; £75; 
and £100.63  In 1998-1999, COPFS received 244,000 reports of criminal offences with 
51,000 offences disposed of by an alternative method,64 9% of accused persons were 
issued with a fiscal warning letter, and 7.78% of accused persons were issued with a fiscal 
fine.  In 2003 - 2004, COPFS received 248,000 reports of criminal offences, with 
alternative disposals being used in 62,000 cases, fiscal warning letters being 8.8% and 
fiscal fines accounting for 12.09%.65  In the same period, the percentage of persons where 
proceedings were brought in court fell from 62.29% to 57.18%.66 
 
57 ibid.Para 4.38. 
58 ibid.Para 4.41. 
59 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1987. 
60 Peter Duff, ‘The Prosecutor Fine’ (1994) 14 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 565. 
61 The Scottish Government, (n 19) Table 6 and Table 21. 
62 See Moody and Tombs (n 26) at 367. 
63 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act (1995). s.302 Version in Force 1st April 1996. 
64 Fiscal Warning 22,000, Diversion 1,000, fiscal fine 19,000, conditional offer 9,000. 
65 Fiscal Warning 22,000, Diversion 1,000, fiscal fine 30,000, conditional offer 9,000. 




2.4 The McInnes Committee 
The McInnes Committee was established in 2004 to review the operation of summary 
justice in Scotland and made several recommendations.67   
The first recommendation was an amendment to the levels of the fiscal fine enabling 
COPFS to impose fines to a maximum of £500, more closely matching the fines imposed 
by the courts under summary proceedings.68  This recommendation was implemented by 
the Criminal Proceedings etc. (Scotland) Act 2007, but with the maximum fine being set at 
£300.69 
The second recommendation was that the fiscal fine should be disclosed to the court if the 
accused was subsequently convicted of another offence. This recommendation was 
qualified with a limitation to a period between two and five years.  The Scottish ministers 
accepted this recommendation which was implemented in the 2007 Act. The period for 
disclosure was set at two years from the date of acceptance of the fiscal fine.70 
Thirdly, the Committee recommended that the fiscal fines should be changed to an opt-out 
system, which required the accused to actively opt-out of the fine and take action to reject 
the fiscal fine.  This change was significant and attracted severe criticism at the committee 
stage of the Bill.  However, the Bill was passed, and any person “offered” a fiscal fine as 
an alternative must now actively take steps to reject the offer.71  The accused could no 
longer simply ignore the offer made by the prosecutor but instead had to take action to 
reject the offer, within 28 days or longer if the offer specifies. 
The Committee recommended that the prosecutor should be empowered to offer the 
accused the option of making restitution to the victim by way of a compensation order. 72 
 
67 The Scottish Parliament (n 29). 
68 ibid. 
69 Summary proceedings are proceedings conducted in the Justice of the Peace court or the Sheriff court 
before a Justice/Sheriff sitting alone (without a jury).  Summary proceedings are reserved (traditionally) for 
the more minor criminal offences in Scotland. 
70 Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 s.50. 
71 ibid. 
72 This is significant in that it contains the subtle change of the fiscal deciding who a victim is rather than 
being a complainer in criminal proceedings and thus be consequence that the accused was an offender, 
whereas previous the fiscal fine was not viewed as a criminal conviction, the use of the word victim in this 




A marked difference between the fiscal fine and the compensation order was that the State 
would not receive the compensation but that the victim would receive this.  The Scottish 
Executive accepted this recommendation with the order not exceeding level five on the 
standard scale.73  The 2007 Act significantly makes a distinction between the method of 
acceptance of a compensation order and the changes to the fiscal fine.  The compensation 
order shall only be deemed to be accepted if the accused makes payment within 28 days or 
another period as may be specified in the offer.74 
The 2007 Act permits the COPFS to make a combined offer to the accused whereby both a 
fiscal fine and a compensation order may be made.  An accused person could be fined 
£300 as a fiscal fine and have a compensation order of £5,000 imposed without ever 
having appeared before a court. 
The Scottish Executive developed the recommendations of the McInnes Committee.  The 
Scottish Executive introduced into the Bill the system of ‘work orders’, and this was 
enacted in the 2007 Act.75  A work order is effectively a community payback order offered 
by the prosecutor to accused persons. The Act enables the prosecutor to offer to an accused 
person a specified number of hours of unpaid work in respect of any offence which is 
competent to be proceeded with under summary procedure.  The work order offer, unlike 
the fiscal fine, requires the accused to accept the offer within 28 days of being offered.  
The work order is limited to a maximum of 50 hours.76  For reasons which this research 
could not establish the Government elected not to align the work order with the community 
payback order powers of the Sheriff in the manner which the fiscal fine was aligned with 
the powers of the Sheriff in summary proceedings. 
It is important to note that the imposition of the fiscal fine, compensation order and the 
work order, will not be treated as “a conviction” but is disclosable to the court within two 
 
73 Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 s.50  
74 ibid s50(2). 
75 ibid s.51. 




years, from the date of acceptance by the accused, should they subsequently be 
convicted.77   
Following the 2007 Act, the 2008/2009 criminal proceedings statistics report showed that 
COPFS received 250,000 reports of criminal offences with 70,000 alternatives to 
prosecutions being accepted (28%).78  The new combined fiscal fine and compensation 
order was only used in 1.42% of alternatives, compensation orders was used in 2.85% and 
the increased fiscal fine being used in 54% of all alternatives used.79 
The statistics, from 2018/2019, show that COPFS received 171,000 criminal offence 
reports with COPFS alternatives being accepted in 35,597 cases (46.62%).  The combined 
fiscal fine and compensation order being used in 8.93% of alternatives, compensation 
orders being used in 2.19% and the increased fiscal fine being used in 51.81% of all 
alternatives used.80 
In their criticisms in the McInnes report, Lockhart and Murray commented:  
many offenders need support and advice in the community, not more fines 
which they cannot pay.  Courts are in a position to provide these services 
through the various non-custodial sentences now available.81   
In highlighting the non-custodial sentencing options available to the courts, it may be 
suggested that by giving similar powers to the prosecutor to use a broader range of 
alternatives, offenders may be able to receive the support and advice in the community 
whilst serving the punishment part of the sentence.82 It may be suggested that this is 
needed at an earlier stage than is possible via the delay-ridden court system. The challenge 
 
77 It has been suggested anecdotally to the researcher that Alternatives to disposals have appeared on 
Criminal record checks via Disclosure Scotland for longer than this period, but no investigations were 
undertaken as this is outwith the scope of this research. 
78 The Scottish Government, ‘Criminal Proceedings in Scotland, 2009-10’ (n 19)-% calculations are the 
researcher’s calculation from the figures. 
79 ibid - percentage calculations are the researcher’s calculation from the figures. 
80 ibid.-% calculations are the researcher’s calculation from the figures.  During the course of the research the 
2019 – 2020 figures were published however due to the impact of Covid-19 the figures had been significantly 
impacted as to reduce their effectiveness in allowing comparisons to be drawn. 
81 The Scottish Parliament (n 29). 
82 It could legitimately be suggested that given the increase in fines, highlighted in this research, that this 




to an effective system which serves both the interests of justice and the offender is the 
limited information which the prosecutor has available to them to enable the imposition of 
an order which will address the needs of the offender to work towards rehabilitation.  The 
sentencer is, however, required to balance the needs of the offender against the other aims 
of sentencing policy.83   
The introduction of the fiscal fine in 1988 was the first significant stage in a policy shift 
towards the pursuit of efficiency in Scotland, it has been suggested that this was the 
beginning of the steady journey towards prosecutorial sentencing.84  Morrow proffers his 
opinion in that “this is not justice.  There are innocent persons who will simply pay the fine 
to get rid of the matter, and there will be people who have been guilty of serious offences, 
only too happy to be diverted to avoid the wrath of the court.” 85  Callander suggests that 
the introduction of the fiscal fine was an early symptom of the system’s increasing 
propensity to view minor crime as presenting a bureaucratic problem.86  The first reforms 
to the fiscal fines followed the McInnes committee which recommended the reform of the 
fine in furtherance of summary justice reform towards a system which is “efficient in the 
use of time and resources.”87  Callander further suggests that the pursuance of these 
efficiency measures which had been recommended were made at the expense of fairness 
and effectiveness of the system.88 
2.5 Circumstances of the Offender 
In Scotland, the sentencing Sheriff can, and in particular circumstances must,89 call for 
background reports.  These reports include an assessment of the ability of the offender to 
undertake unpaid work, a criminal justice social work report to understand the 
circumstances of the offender and offending behaviour, psychological reports, and any 
report which the Sheriff may deem necessary to allow the court to reach a decision on 
 
83 For information on the purposes and aims of sentencing see: 
https://www.scottishsentencingcouncil.org.uk/about-sentencing/introduction-to-sentencing/, accessed 10th 
August 2020. 
84 Fionda, Public Prosecutors and Discretion: A comparative Study at P. 237 
85 M., Morrow, “Justice Diverted” 2008, The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 
86 I Callander, “The pursuit of efficiency in the reform of the Scottish fiscal fine: should we opt out of the 
conditional offer?” 2013 SLT (News) 37-42 (Part 1) 
87 The Summary Justice Review Committee: Report to Ministers (2004), (McInnes Report Para 2.2) 
88 I Callander, “The pursuit of efficiency in the reform of the Scottish fiscal fine: should we opt out of the 
conditional offer?” 2013 SLT (News) 47-53 (Part 2) 




sentencing.  The value of such reports is recognised in Scots law, particularly, with first 
time offenders or those facing a custodial sentence for the first time.  Such reports allow 
the Sheriff to form an overall impression of the offender, not just the offending behaviour, 
understand which aspects of the offender’s life require to be addressed and in what form, 
and have advice concerning the attitude of the offender towards methodologies of 
addressing offending behaviour.  Velasquez’s research on the sentencing practices of 
sheriffs states that the background reports are essential in the Sheriff selecting the correct 
sentence: 
the CJSWR (Criminal Justice Social Work Report) and the PiM (Plea in 
Mitigation) are the critical data that help the Sheriff to move from a draft of a 
sentence towards a narrative of the nature of the offence and the offender. 
These narratives help the Judge to determine the ‘right’ sentence.90 
In the system of diversion from prosecution91, The National Guidelines on Diversion 
from Prosecution in Scotland permits an assessment to be conducted on an accused 
person.92  This assessment considers antecedent information on mental health, 
alcohol/drugs, risk, vulnerabilities, disabilities, attitude to offending, family dynamics 
and education/employment and training.93  This information is all made available to the 
public prosecutor in a diversion assessment. It is not made available or conducted in 
respect of the imposition of the alternative to prosecution.   
In 2011 the Scottish Government report highlighted that the circumstances of the offender 
and the mitigatory factors to the offending behaviour were a weakness in the Scottish 
system.94  In 2020, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prosecution in Scotland, reported to 
the Lord Advocate that “the key theme arising from our examination of the cases was 
that SPRs95 were too often not completed with sufficient information about the young 
 
90 Javier Velásquez Valenzuela, ‘Doing Justice: Sentencing Practices in Scottish Sheriff Courts’ (University 
of Glasgow 2018). 
91 See explanation in the Introduction of the difference between a diversion from prosecution and an 
alternative to prosecution. 
92 Community Justice Scotland, ‘National Guidelines on Diversion from Prosecution in Scotland’ (2020). 
93 ibid. 
94 Patsy Richards et al, ‘Crime and Justice Summary Justice Reform: Evaluation of Direct Measures’ (2011) 
at 5.16. 
95 Standard Police Reports, are the reports issued by Police Scotland to COPFS and contain details of the 




person’s mental health and other vulnerabilities.”96 To date, no steps have been taken to 
address this fundamental weakness in the alternatives system. 
2.6 Driving Offences  
Following the Stewart Committee, the majority of driving offences in Scotland are dealt 
with by way of the imposition of a fixed penalty notice issued by Police Scotland.97 The 
most common disqualification method of a driver in Scotland is the “totting up” ban.  
Totting up is where the accused person has accumulated 12 points on their driving licence 
and automatically has a ban imposed by the court unless there are exceptional hardships in 
the imposition of a ban.98 It is required that the offender be summonsed to court to have the 
ban imposed.99  An accused person who will trigger 12 points on their driving licence 
appears at a pleading diet in the Sheriff Court, whereby if they plead guilty a 6-month 
driving ban would be imposed.  The accused may request an exceptional hardship hearing 
which will be scheduled for a future date.100  This process is distinguished from the system 
in the Netherlands.101 
In Scotland, for the period 2009/2010 – 2018/2019, 123,231 criminal cases in respect of 
speeding offences have proceeded to court, with an average of 12,323 cases per year.  99% 
of these cases resulted in a financial penalty.102  
Whilst more detailed consideration is given in the recommendation section of this thesis, it 
would appear that making the “totting up” procedure an administrative function with an 
option to request a trial or exceptional hardship hearing would be a viable consideration to 
the system in Scotland, given that the statute stipulates a minimum period of ban under the 
“totting up” procedure.103 
 
96 ‘HM Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland: Annual Report 2019 to 2020’ 
https://www.gov.scot/publications/hm-inspectorate-prosecution-scotland-annual-report-2019-20/pages/3/ 
accessed 22 December 2020. 
97 See 2.3. 
98 See Road Traffic Act 1998 C.53 Part II s35. 
99 Road Traffic Act 1988 s35. 
100 ibid. 
101 See Chapter 3. 
102 The Scottish Government, ‘Criminal Proceedings in Scotland, 2009-10’ (n 19). 




2.7 Discount on Sentence 
Scotland operates a policy of recognising the utilitarian value of the early guilty plea in the 
Scottish Court system.  An accused pleading guilty at the earliest opportunity receives a 
discount on the headline sentence which the court would have otherwise imposed.104  The 
maximum discount available in Scotland upon the tendering of a guilty plea is one third.  
For example: if the Sheriff deems the appropriate sentence is a fine of £300, then this may 
be discounted to £200.  There is no legislative requirement in the application of a discount 
to the use of alternatives to prosecution.  This discounting policy creates a scenario 
whereby, particularly with financial penalties, an accused person may be better to reject the 
alternative, go to court and receive the discount on the sentence.105   
The average court fine in the last ten years is £200 with the average amount in 2017 -2018 
and 2018 – 2019 being £230. 106  Arguably, the powers of the public prosecutor to impose a 
fiscal fine of up to £300 raises questions of the economic purpose of processing these cases 
through the court system. As suggested in this research, however, the economic 
perspective is only one element to be considered in a rounded, effective, and respected 
criminal justice system.  The framing of sentencing policy in Scotland, the purposes of 
sentencing and the consistency of sentencing approaches have been reformed in Scotland 
by the introduction of the Scottish Sentencing Council.107 
2.8 Scottish Sentencing Council 
The Scottish Sentencing Council was created in 2010 with the purpose of establishing and 
ensuring the formulation of consistent sentencing practices in Scotland. 108  At the point of 
creation of the Scottish Sentencing Council, Scotland was recognised as making the most 
use of prison sentences compared to similar neighbouring jurisdictions.109  Given that the 
 
104 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act (1995), s196. 
105 See: Tata and Gormley (n 47). 
106 The Scottish Government, ‘Costs of the Criminal Justice System in Scotland Dataset’ (2017). 
107 At the time of writing only one sentencing guideline has been promulgated to the High Court by the 
Scottish Sentencing council. – See The Scottish Sentencing Council, ‘Introduction to the Scottish Sentencing 
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accessed 18 October 2020. 
108 ibid. 
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policymakers and those involved in the criminal justice system came together to recognise 
that there was/is inconsistency in the imposition of sentences in Scotland, it is somewhat 
surprising that the Scottish Sentencing Council has no remit to consider the consistency of 
the imposition of penalties by the public prosecutor in Scotland. 
Scotland, traditionally, has not operated a system whereby the sentencing is directed by the 
actions of the prosecutor, or in the large majority of Scotland by sentencing directed by 
statute. Indeed, in Scotland, the public prosecutor has no locus to be heard on sentencing at 
the first instance but may appeal against an unduly lenient sentence in the public 
interest.110   
There has been a shift in Scotland in the larger number of statutory offences being 
introduced111 with mandatory minimum sentences included in statute as well as legislation 
relating to the presumption against short sentences in Scotland.112   
There appears to be no methodology of ensuring that there is a consistency across the 
Scottish criminal justice system as to the appropriate range of punishments which an 
offender may receive. The position regarding consistency is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
2.9 Economic Rationale 
The introduction of alternatives to prosecution was developed primarily to achieve an 
economic advantage to the public purse;113 if Scotland were to develop a system whereby 
COPFS had similar powers to those available in the Netherlands what is there to be gained 
from an economic perspective?   
The costs of a court procedure in Scotland are only available as estimations, highlighted in 
Chapter 1, the system already in place in Scotland saves a significant amount of taxpayer’s 
 
110 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act (1995), s228 (a). 
111 See James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘Scotland: Twice as Much Criminal Law as England?’ (2013) 
17 Edinburgh Law Review 376 which demonstrates that in 2010/11 twice the number of criminal offences 
were created in Scotland, versus the number created in England. 
112 Presumption Against Short Periods of Imprisonment (Scotland) Order 2019. 




money and meets the utilitarian managerialist approach adopted in recent years in 
Scotland.   
In 2018 – 2019, there were 73,703 cases proceeded at Sheriff Summary or Justice of the 
Peace court.114  In terms of a sentencing basis for analysis, 15,206 cases were disposed of 
via a community payback order, 37,294 via a financial penalty, and 13,676 cases where the 
sentence was an absolute discharge or admonition.   If a system were to be adopted in 
Scotland similar to that of the Netherlands, a further 66,176 cases become available for 
consideration under a punishment order schema.115 
It is unrealistic to expect every case which previously would have proceeded to court to be 
appropriately disposed of via an alternative disposal.  The Court has a significant role to 
play in the deterrence of crime merely by a person having to appear in court in the first 
place. However, it is realistic for the public to expect justice to be delivered swiftly, 
effectively, and economically. 
Table 1, below, demonstrates the potential gross savings in disposing of all sentences via 
an alternative disposal schema, based on the percentage of cases which may then become 












Table 1 - Case Cost Calculation - Scotland116 
% of 
cases 10 25 33 50 60 75 
Number 
of Cases 6,618 16,544 21,838 33,088 39,706 49,632 
Cost per 




(£) 7,372,452 18,430,016 24,327,532 36,860,032 44,232,484 55,290,048 
 
In Scotland, of the cases proceeded within court, significant numbers are resolved by the 
tendering of a guilty plea.  In 2015 – 2016, in the Justice of the Peace Court 29,665 of 
cases (or 94%) proceeding were resolved by plea. In Sheriff Summary proceedings, 47,057 
plea resolutions were obtained from 52,673 summary cases, being 89% of cases and in 
Sheriff Solemn proceedings, 4,398 cases were resolved by a plea from 5,513 cases, being 
79%.117 Given the significantly high proportion of cases resolved by plea and the statistical 
data regarding the sentences imposed on an accused in the JP and Sheriff Summary court 
any development of the alternative measures system, must be suitably robust to ensure a 
reduction in the number of cases proceeding to a court setting. Cases, it may be suggested, 
should only proceed to court where the circumstances dictate that the court is the only 
suitable method of addressing the offending behaviour. 
If there were no criminal offending in Scotland, it would, logically, be a significant saving 
to the public purse in Scotland.  While this might be a philosophical aim, it is also 
 
116 The Calculation of the costs in Table 1 is derived from The Scottish Government, ‘Costs of the Criminal 
Justice System in Scotland Dataset’ (2017) by averaging the Scottish Government figure of the total costs of 
each type of case. 
117 Scottish Parliament Justice Committee Publications, ‘Lord Advocate: Evidence to the Justice Committee 




unrealistic and unachievable.  Crime is a fact of everyday life; it is a societal norm.118  This 
reality, however, does not mean that practical steps cannot be taken to reduce criminal 
offending and seek the rehabilitation of offenders.  The justice system is often said to be 
directed to the rehabilitation of offenders being for the broader good of society.  Indeed, 
the practice in Scotland is to refer to the sentence imposed on the offender rather than ‘the 
punishment’.119  McNeill argues, however, that:  
no amount of person change can secure desistance if change is not recognised 
and supported by the community (social rehabilitation), by the law and by the 
State (judicial rehabilitation).  Without these informal and formal recognitions, 
legitimate opportunities will not become available, and (a) return to offending 
may be made more likely.120  
2.10 Conclusions 
Since the introduction in Scotland of alternatives to prosecution there has been sustained 
development to the available disposals. As Callandar suggests:  
Extending the fiscal's discretionary sentencing powers aggravates unease over the 
disparity endemic to hidden decision making, and heightens concern for adequate 
levels of transparency within the justice system.121 
Since 1988, the use, frequency, and number of alternatives to prosecution have continued 
to rise.  These developments have occurred without any further review, evaluation, or 
examination as to the impact on the criminal justice system in Scotland, or the actors 
involved in the process or the public whom they are designed to serve.    
In summary, the currently available alternatives in Scots Criminal law are as follows: 
 
118 Marcus Felson and Rachel Boba, Crime and Everyday Life (4th edn, SAGE Publications 2010). 
119 See: Lord President & Lord Justice Clerk Carloway, ‘Sacro Sentencing: Beyond Punishment and 
Deterrence’ (2013). 
120 Fergus McNeill, ‘Desistance and Criminal Justice in Scotland’ (2016) Crime, justice and society in 
Scotland 200. 
121 I Callander, “The pursuit of efficiency in the reform of the Scottish fiscal fine: should we opt out of the 




Table 2 – Alternatives to Prosecution (Direct Measures) in Scotland 
Alternative Comment 
Fiscal Warning Letter/Verbal A warning that the accused could have 
been prosecuted in court and is warned as 
to future conduct. 
Fiscal Fine Fines can range from £50 to £500 
Compensation order Maximum compensation £3,000 
Fiscal Work Order 10-50 hours of unpaid work 
Reparation and Mediation To provide the opportunity for a person 
responsible for a crime to engage in a 
restorative process and to make amends for 






Chapter 3: The Role of the Prosecutor and the System of Alternatives in the 
Netherlands  
In this chapter, the system of alternatives to prosecution in the Netherlands is considered. 
This chapter considers the available alternatives, how the system of public prosecution has 
developed and the current position. 
3.1 The Prosecution System in the Netherlands 
The criminal court procedure of the Netherlands is an inquisitorial system developed from 
the French legal system as a result of the occupation of the Netherlands from 1810 to 1814.  
In 1827, legislation created a system of law and created the role of the public prosecutor.122  
It has been suggested that the Dutch prosecutor functions in an intermediary position 
between the Judiciary and the Executive.123   
The Dutch Prosecutor has been recognized as a sentencer for many years, as 
witness the prosecutor’s title of ‘standing magistrate’ as compared with the 
‘sitting magistrate’ which is the term given to the judiciary.124 
The system in the Netherlands has faced significant criticisms in respect of the role of the 
public prosecutor by their having judicial powers but not having the same independent 
powers as the Judiciary.125   
In 1999, an amendment to the 1827 Act was passed. 126   This amendment clarified and 
developed the role of the public prosecutor to its current position. This development 
occurred following a request from the Minister of Justice to establish a commission to 
study the functioning of the prosecution service and address the functional challenges 
faced by the prosecution service.127 
 
122 Wet op de Zamenstelling der Regterlijke Magt en het Beleid der Justitie van 18 april 1827, Stb. 1827. 
123 Tony Paul Marguery, ‘Unity and Diversity of the Public Prosecution Services in Europe. A Study of the 
Czech, Dutch, French and Polish Systems’ (s.n 2008) at 6 
124 Fionda (n 1) at 239. 
125 Marguery (n 111) at 6. 
126 Wet Van 19 April 1999, Stb. 1999, 194. 





The purpose of the system of prosecution in the Netherlands, Openbaar Ministrie (O.M.), 
as required by the Judicial Organisation Act is to: maintain the law; prosecute persons 
suspected of having committed offences; and ensure that sentences given by the courts are 
effectively enforced. 128  The manner in which the O.M. is to conduct these roles is also 
contained within statute.129  A deputy represents the O.M. in each of the ten regions of the 
Netherlands, called the Chief Prosecutor of that region, who in turn is represented by 
deputies who conduct the daily business of the prosecution service. 
The O.M. has the exclusive power to bring prosecution proceedings against any person in 
the Netherlands.130  The O.M. is required to operate within national guidelines.  These 
guidelines are prescribed by the Minister of Justice, who ensures enforcement through the 
Office of the O.M..  The guidelines are produced for the O.M., after consultation with the 
Board of Attorneys-General.131   
The 1999 report clarified the relationship between the Government, in particular the 
Minister of Justice, and the prosecution service.  Article one of the 1827 Act, as amended, 
articulates that the public prosecutor serves as a judicial official but is still under the 
authority of the Minister of Justice. The Dutch prosecutor is required to enforce the 
criminal law and to carry out any other task provided by law.132 
The prosecutor has a wide range of power in criminal cases: whether to proceed with the 
prosecution; to impose an alternative to prosecution, or to take no action.  This is 
commonly referred to as ‘the opportunity principle’ or the ‘expediency principle’.133  The 
criminal code134 provides that once the investigation stage is completed the prosecution 
 
128 Wet rechterlijke organisatie[RO]Art 124. Recently, with the introduction of the strafbeschikking 
(punishment order),  the prosecuting definition has also been extended to include prosecution by means of a 
strafbeschikking (punishment order). Article 167 lid1 and 242 lid1 Sv. 
129 Wetboek van Strafvordering, wet van 15 januari 1921, houdende vastelling van een Wetboek van 
Strafvordering. 1921., houdende vastelling van een Wetboek van Strafvordering, Act in force from 1926 and 
Wetboek van Strafrecht, wet van 2 maart 1881, Stb.35 1881. 
130 There are some bodies with powers to impose a fine upon citizens, but this is of a limited nature and is 
outwith the scope of this research. 
131 College van procureurs generaal. The regular meetings of this body have become an important control 
mechanism of the policy execution by the OM. Since 1995 the “meeting” has been transformed into a 
“college” and was formally recognised in the (new) Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie (1999). 
132 Criminal Code of the Netherlands Article 124. 
133 Opportuniteitsbeginsel. For a more detailed description of expediency, see Hans de Doelder, ‘De 
Teloorgang van Het Opportuniteitsbeginsel’ [2005] Praktisch strafrecht, Liber amoricum JM Reijntjes. Also 
Christina Petronella Maria Cleiren and Johannes F Nijboer, Tekst En Commentaar Strafrecht (Kluwer 1997).  




service decides upon the charge, whether proceedings should be brought at all, whether to 
use an alternative to prosecution or whether to issue a summons to appear in court.   
The prosecutor has a general power to waive prosecution for “reasons of public 
interest.”135  The supervisory board has issued generic guidelines which are given great 
credence which may be deviated from in particular circumstances.  The public prosecutor 
can waive prosecution if any of the following circumstances apply: 
 a response other than penal measures or sanctions is preferable, or would be more 
effective; 
 the prosecution would be disproportionate, unjust or ineffective in relation to the 
nature of the offence; 
 the prosecution would be disproportionate, unjust or ineffective for reasons related 
to the offender; 
 the prosecution would be contrary to the interests of the State; and 
 the prosecution would be contrary to the interests of the victim.  
Prior to proceeding against an accused the prosecutor is required to consider whether to 
dismiss the case due to a warrant of law.  These reasons for a warrant of law are: 
 the accused was incorrectly charged as a suspect; 
 insufficient evidence in law to proceed; 
 inadmissibility of a prosecution; 
 the court does not have jurisdiction over the case; 
 the act does not constitute a crime; and 
 




 the offender is not criminally liable due to a justification or complete defence to the 
crime. 
The expediency principle has been subject to development, in its interpretation, since it 
was given statutory recognition in the criminal code in 1926.136  Anderson137 suggests that 
this can be broadly broken down into three phases: the “negative phase” (Pre 1970); 
“positive interpretation” (1970 – 1985); and the “Judicial Intervention phase” (1985 -).  
The ‘negative phase’ was the period whereby prosecution was the norm, and as a 
generality, all offences were prosecuted.  The ‘positive interpretation’ period was 
summarised as the question for the prosecutor being ‘why prosecute?’ rather than ‘why not 
prosecute?’.138   
The Judicial Intervention phase requires the prosecutor to act either by prosecution or by 
using their quasi-judicial function.  During the period of the 1980s, politicians in the 
Netherlands expressed dissatisfaction with the prosecution system, particularly the less 
than robust response to cases, with significant numbers of cases being disposed of via 
unconditional waivers. In response to the criticism of the then prevalent system in the 
Netherlands a policy document was produced. This policy document considered the 
broader range of powers given to the prosecutor and how these powers were to be used.  
The policy outlined the steps to be taken between 1985 and 1990 to ‘improve the 
maintenance of law and order’.139 This development resulted in a significant drop in 
unconditional waivers by approximately 50%.  By 1990, 43% of cases, were processed in 
court and 51% disposed of using transactions. 
In 1999, the Netherlands introduced the Polaris – Guidelines.  The Polaris - Guidelines is a 
system brought in to standardise the decision-making process of prosecutors without 
removing the prosecutors’ discretion.  For each criminal offence reported to the prosecutor, 
a number of “sentencing points” are attributed to all aspects of the offence.  This system is 
 
136 ‘Criminal Code of the Netherlands’ (n 122) Articles 167 and 242.  
137 Adriaan Mauritz Anderson, ‘Alternative Disposal of Criminal Cases by the Prosecutor: Comparing the 
Netherlands and South Africa’ (University of Amsterdam 2014). 
138 JMAV Moons, ‘Het Opportuniteitsbeginsel. Enige Notities over Zijn Inhoud En Omvang’ (1969) 
Nederlands Juris tenblad 485. 
139 See The Government of the Netherlands, ‘Samenleving En Criminaliteit: Een Beleidsplan Voor de 




outlined in the Board of Prosecutors General policy document.140  The system considers 
aggravating circumstances such as the use of a weapon in an assault or prior criminal 
convictions.  The Polaris - Guidelines were developed to produce case options available to 
each prosecutor based on the crime reported.  The prosecutor is permitted to deviate from 
the guidelines but must give a written reason to the chief prosecutor, and where the 
deviation from the guidelines may be perceived to be significant it must be approved by 
the regional chief prosecutor.141  The Polaris system is considered further in Chapter 4. 
3.2 Development of Alternatives to Prosecution in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, a report to the prosecutor may not necessarily result in traditional court 
proceedings.  The O.M. has a variety of alternative disposals available for their use.  These 
are a diversion to the settlement of reconciliation between the victim and the offender; use 
of a caution - oral or written admonition; a transaction; a punishment order; and a 
conditional waiver.   
Diversion to settlement of reconciliation between the victim and the offender is a system 
which attempts to reduce crime or escalation of criminal behaviour whilst addressing the 
needs of the victim.  Diversion to reconciliation can only apply where the conduct is so 
minor that the prosecutor would be minded to apply an unconditional waiver from criminal 
proceedings. If the conduct is more serious, after the reconciliation, a conditional waiver or 
transaction may be imposed.  The reconciliation does not involve the prosecutor, and the 
outcome of the reconciliation does not bind them.  The prosecutor is, however, obliged to 
consider the outcome of reconciliation when making a prosecutorial decision. 
A caution – oral or written admonition - can be summarised as an action by the prosecutor 
to intimate to the accused that they have broken the law and they should consider 
themselves fortunate not to have criminal proceedings brought against them.  This caution 
is applied in circumstances where it would be disproportionate to impose another penalty 
but where the prosecutor deems it necessary to warn the accused. 
 
140 ‘Netherlands Public Prosecution Service at a Glance | Publication | Public Prosecution Service’ 
<https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/documents/publications/openbaar-ministerie/algemeen/alles/netherlands-
public-prosecution-service-at-a-glance> accessed 8 November 2020. 




In last twenty years, the percentage of cases disposed of using these first two alternatives 
ranged from 7.79% of cases in 2001 to 2.15% of cases in 2018.  The peak arose in 2002 at 
7.85% of all cases.142 
The ‘Transaction’ was introduced by statute in 1921.143 Prior to 1983 this was reserved for 
cases whereby the law prescribed a sentence of only a fine.  In 1983, following the 
Financial Penalties Committee report, the criminal code was amended to those offences 
which carry a statutory prison sentence of less than six years.144 The term transaction 
effectively covers several conditional discharges from criminal proceedings and contains a 
variety of alternative measures to prosecution. The legislative framework for the 
functioning of transactions in the Netherlands is found in Article 74 of the criminal 
code.145  
Table 3 below summaries the available transaction types: 
  
 
142 Researcher’s Calculation, based on Statistics supplied by the Statistics Netherlands Info Service available 
at–  http://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/83944NED/table?ts=1594642130803. 
143 An in-depth review of the historical development of transactie, see P Osinga, ‘Transactie in Strafzaken’ 
[1992] Arnhem. Diss. UvA. 
144 ‘Criminal Code of the Netherlands’ (n 122): Section 74 CC, Financial Penalties Act 1983. 




Table 3 - Transaction Types in the Netherlands 
Transaction Type Comment 
Fine Not less than three Euros and not more than 
maximum statutory fine 
Relinquishing/renunciation of title to objects 
that have been seized and that are subject to 
forfeiture or confiscation146 
Ownership of the item is given to the State 
Surrendering or payment of the estimated value 
to the State of objects subject to forfeiture or 
confiscation 
This applies to articles that can be forfeited, 
but which are not in the custody of the State 
Forfeiture of items or payment of a sum being 
the estimated gain from the criminal offence 
Similar to the proceeds of crime legislation in 
Scotland.147 
Compensation Order Payment for the damage caused by the 
criminal offence either in full or partial 
compensation.148 
Work Order Unpaid work or training lasting a maximum of 
120 hours. 
 
The Transaction is the most widely used alternative by the prosecution service.  During the 
last twenty years, disposals of cases by transaction ranged between 34.64% (2001) to 
25.54% (2018), with the peak usage being 36.02% of cases in 2012.149 
 
146 Article 33 Sr. prescribes the articles that are open for forfeiture whereas Article 36(c) and 36(d) Sr. 
prescribes which articles may be confiscated. 
147 Article 36 (e) Sr.  also called the “plukze” legislation. 
148 Similar to the determination of the illegally obtained benefit, the prosecutor can estimate the correct 
damage.   
149 Researcher’s calculation, based on statistics supplied by the Statistics Netherlands Info Service –Available 




A significant difference between the Scottish system and that of the Netherlands is the 
ability of the Dutch prosecutor to declare the guilt of an accused, impose a criminal 
sanction, and record a criminal record without the requirement for the accused to attend a 
court. This criminal sanction is in the form of a punishment order, to require the offender 
to complete a sentence such as: unpaid work (community payback order); payment of a 
fine; a driving disqualification; make payment of a compensation order or a forfeiture 
order.  The punishment order does not, unlike other alternatives, require the consent of the 
offender; it is the imposition of a punishment on the offender after the prosecutor has 
determined the guilt of the accused.   
One particular type of punishment order available to the prosecutor in the Netherlands is 
the power to impose a disqualification from driving on the offender.  In the Netherlands, 
the public prosecutor, via a punishment order, has the discretion to impose a driving ban of 
up to six months.   
The accused has the right to appeal a punishment order and have this appeal heard in court. 
If an objection is lodged to the order, the O.M. has three options available in deciding how 
to proceed.  The prosecutor can withdraw the charge and order, change the order, or issue a 
summons to court.  Where the prosecutor changes the order, the accused has the right to 
challenge the order as amended.  If the prosecutor withdraws the charge and punishment 
order the option to prosecute lapses.  In the case of issuing a summons, the case is then 
held in court in the usual manner.150 
The effectiveness of the punishment order was considered in the evaluation of 
“bestuurlijke strafbeschikking.”151 The report concluded that the punishment order did not 
result in a drop in offences or lead to a change in offending behaviour but reduced the 
weight of the business on the court service.152  In light of the lack of comparative data 
available in Scotland being made available an examination of the effectiveness of the 
alternative measures was somewhat limited.153   
 
150 See Criminal Code – Ss 255 to 257. 
151 Sander Flight et al, ‘Bestuurlijke Strafbeschikking En Bestuurlijke Boete Overlast: Evaluatie Na Drie 
Jaar’ (DSP-Groep 2012). 
152 ibid. 




In 2010, 5.72% of reports to the public prosecutor were disposed of by using a punishment 
order, rising to 15.87% in 2018.154  The median figure over this period was 16.44% of 
cases.  
The conditional waiver, the final alternative available to the prosecutor, is non statutory but 
may be offered to an accused where the prosecutor is of the view that this would be 
preferable and in the public interest rather than prosecution. Such conditional waivers may 
include conditions which the prosecutor sees fit, such as the accused attending for alcohol 
or drug treatment. In the period, 2001 to 2018, conditional waivers were the least used 
alternative with the 2001 use accounting for 1.05% of all alternative disposals and in 2018 
4.69%. A peak was reached in 2014 of 5.01%.155 
The use of alternatives to prosecution, with the exclusion of the punishment order, is not 
registered against the offenders’ criminal records and is not available to the court for 
consideration in any future criminal proceedings at any point.   
In the Dutch system, it is compulsory to inform the victim that an alternative has been 
offered to the accused. The victim has the power to challenge a decision to offer an 
alternative to prosecution formally.  Article 12 of the Dutch criminal code provides that 
any person with a direct interest can challenge the decision of the prosecutor.156 If a person 
challenges the decision of the prosecutor, it is for the court to judge whether the prosecutor 
decided correctly.  If the court upholds the complaint, it can direct the prosecutor to 
prosecute or continue a prosecution. Some commentators suggest that the Dutch prosecutor 
is dominus litis; given the power of review by the court, it is questionable that this is, in 
reality, the case.157 
The use of alternatives to prosecution, in the Netherlands, in the last twenty years has 
fluctuated from 34.64% (2001), of all cases reported to the prosecutor, to 25.54% (2018).  
 
154 Researchers Calculation, based on Statistics supplied by the Statistics Netherlands Info Service –Available 
at  http://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/83944NED/table?ts=1594642130803. Accessed 19th 
November 2020. 
155 Ibid. 
156 ‘Criminal Code of the Netherlands’ (n 122). Articles 250 & 262. 




The peak was reached in 2002 at 36.02% of all offences which proceeded either by 
prosecution or use of an alternative. 
3.3 Discount on Sentence 
In the Netherlands, accused persons receive a maximum discount of 20% on sentence in a 
guilty plea, and this is automatically applied in the imposition of a punishment order. The 
system permits the prosecutor to ask the judge for a more severe sentence should the 
accused not have a valid objection to the punishment order but insists on being heard in 
court.158   
Furthermore, the judicial sentencing guidelines are not the same guidelines adhered to by 
the prosecutors.159  It is particularly striking, considering previous research findings, that 
judges actually impose the sanction requested by the prosecutor in less than half of 
cases.160  Given the stated differences between the prosecutor’s requested punishment and 
the Judge’s imposition of a sentence, there is no reason to believe that the same differences 
would not apply to punishment orders, mutatis mutandis.  The Justice Minister has directly 
addressed this concern in stating that the reason for this is to discourage accused persons 
from frivolously objecting to punishment orders and to continue to alleviate the pressures 
on the court system.161 
3.4 European Convention on Human Rights Compliance 
A further consideration of any imposition of a criminal sanction by the State is the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), particularly Article 6.  The Netherlands 
is a member of the European Union and is obliged to comply with the convention.  A 
criminal charge may be defined as “the official notification given to an individual by the 
competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence.”162  An 
accused person waiving their right to a hearing before an impartial tribunal will only be 
 
158 States General of the Netherlands, ‘Parliamentary Papers I, 2005/06, 29 849, C’. 
159 Prosecutors use the Polaris guidelines system, the Judge use Orientation Points guidelines. 
160 Anne Marie Slotboom et al, ‘De Relatie Tussen Eis En Vonnis: Strafvordering En Straftoemeting in Vier 
Arrondissementen’ (1992) 8 Justitiële verkenningen 59. 
161 States General of the Netherlands (n 146). 




considered a valid waiver whereby the accused has made “a voluntary, informed and 
unequivocal election not to claim their right.”163   
The Netherlands’ compliance with the Convention rights of the accused has been a point of 
debate.164 The ECHR states that the imposition of administrative fines complies with 
Article 6 providing that the access to the courts is guaranteed.165 The accused, in the failure 
to lodge opposition to the punishment order, is waiving their right to have the case heard 
by a court. It is arguable, therefore, that the accused person retains the right to have their 
case heard by an independent tribunal per Article 6.166 At the implementation of the 
punishment order, in the criminal code of the Netherlands, the Dutch Justice Minister 
addressed this point in a ministerial statement concerning the compatibility with Article 6 
saying: 
It can be concluded from ECHR case law that an extrajudicial ‘preliminary 
procedure’ would not encounter objections, provided an appeal to the court is 
possible which meets the requirements of the Convention.167 
3.5 Circumstances of the Accused 
In the Netherlands, the accused has a limited right to be heard by the prosecutor.  This right 
to be heard occurs before the imposition of a punishment order. The criminal code requires 
that the prosecutor hear from the accused before the imposition of a punishment order 
requiring community service or disqualification from driving.168  For fines above €2,000 
the accused has the right to be heard by the prosecutor with legal counsel.  This right to be 
heard provides an opportunity for the accused person to make representations to the 
prosecutor as to the appropriate disposal in the case and offer mitigating factors to the 
 
163 Millar v Dickson [2001] UKPC D 4; 2002 SC (PC) 30.– see also: McGowan v B [2011] UKSC 54 para.18 
164 See: Anderson (n 125). 
165 Öztürk case ( ECHR 21 – 2 – 1984), Series A 73, NJ 1988, 937 and Bendenoun case (ECHR 24 – 2 – 
1994), Series A 284, NJ 1994, 496 m.nt.EAA. 
166 See Cleiren and Nijboer (n 121) at 863–864. 
167 Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 29 849, 3. 




offending behaviour, or to provide information to the public prosecutor which may directly 
impact the nature of conditions attached to any punishment order imposed.169 
3.6 Conclusion 
In the Netherlands, there has been significant development of the alternative disposals 
system since its introduction.  At each stage of the development of the alternatives system 
in the Netherlands, it has been a policy-driven approach, responding to the societal 
challenges and issues facing the Netherlands.170  The implementation, use and enforcement 
of alternatives in the Netherlands are somewhat different from that of Scotland. These 
differences are examined in the forthcoming chapters. 
In summary, the alternatives available to the prosecutor in the Netherlands are as follows: 
Table 4 - Alternatives to Prosecution in the Netherlands 
Alternative Comment 
Diversion The accused is given the opportunity to undertake an appropriate 
programme for their needs in order to avoid prosecution. 
Caution (oral or 
written) 
A warning that the accused could have been prosecuted in court and is 
warned as to future conduct. 
Transaction Maximum compensation €3,000 
Punishment Order or 
Penalty Order 
Fine, community service (unpaid work), disqualification from driving, 
compensation order or forfeiture order 
Conditional Waiver A condition is placed upon the accused, which must be satisfied prior 
to the waiving of the right to prosecute. 
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Chapter 4: Consistency in the Offer of an Alternative to Prosecution 
This chapter considers the consistency of an offer of an alternative to prosecution in both 
jurisdictions and upon a statistical analysis of the position seeks to draw conclusions and 
raise questions as to the position in Scotland versus the operation of the system in the 
Netherlands. 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law.171 
This Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a fundamental consideration in any system 
of law.  In this research we consider how the system of alternatives to prosecution operate 
in respect of equal treatment before the law. Noting that there is no onus on member states 
to prove compliance, Article 7 of the declaration, by its very nature, poses questions 
concerning alternatives to prosecution in Scotland as compared to those in the Netherlands 
regarding the equal treatment of persons in the alternative disposals system, the protections 
to ensure equal treatment in the operation of the systems, and whether the Scottish system 
offers adequate protection to ensure all are treated equally. 
4.1 Case Marking in Scotland 
In the Scottish system, prosecutors are bound by the prosecution code and are required to 
follow guidelines issued by the Lord Advocate. Neither the prosecution code nor the Lord 
Advocate’s guidelines have a basis in statute, and nor can they be enforced through the 
courts.172  COPFS does not publish the Lord Advocate’s guidelines in full and states: 
Lord Advocate’s Guidelines or prosecution policy and guidance is only 
published where its publication would not, or would not be likely to, prejudice 
substantially the prevention or detection of crime; the apprehension or 
prosecution of offenders; or the administration of justice. Prejudice may include 
allowing offenders to circumvent the law by restricting their offending to 
 
171 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (United Nations), Article 7. 




conduct which falls short of a prosecution threshold or, for example, a threshold 
which determines the prosecution forum.173 
It is therefore not possible to examine the guidelines used by prosecutors to understand the 
particular criteria applied to every case beyond the statistical analysis of the offences with 
the same nomen juris.174 This lack of ability to critically examine the guidelines or the criteria 
creates a situation where it is impossible to understand in which circumstances, when 
particularly applied, the use of alternatives to prosecution is ruled out nor, indeed, in which 
circumstances would an alternative always be applied.  Given that COPFS employs 
approximately 500 Procurators Fiscal’s175 who are responsible individually for applying the 
guidelines to particular cases, the lack of transparency of the decision-making process used 
by COPFS raises significant concerns. This lack of transparency gives rise to concern that 
all persons may not be treated equally.   
Moody and Tombs176 established that decision making in COPFS was significantly based 
upon individual judgement, but that “common perceptions of appropriate goals and methods 
of achieving such goals” were gained over time by individual fiscals.  This individualist 
approach to case marking gives rise to concerns regarding the consistency of approach and 
fairness to all persons involved in the Scottish criminal justice system.  These concerns, 
however, cannot be substantiated and without a full review of the COPFS decision-making 
process. It is recognised that this would require significant time, resources, and access, given 
the number of decision-makers and unique nature of each case presented to an individual 
fiscal. 
Since the research of Moody and Tombs in 1982, as far as this researcher has been able to 
establish, there has been limited access to the COPFS for researchers. An FOI requested was 
submitted to COPFS asking:  
(a) Since Moody and Tombs (1982) were given researcher access to COPFS, 
how many researchers have been given access to COPFS for the purposes of 
 
173 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, ‘Prosecution Policy and Guidance’ (2020) 
https://www.copfs.gov.uk/publications/prosecution-policy-and-guidance accessed 18 October 2020. 
174 See James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law 
Review 217 for a critique of the history of the labelling of criminal offences. 
175 See - ‘HM Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland (n 86). 




conducting academic research? Please state the years in which access has 
been given and where possible provide the topic of the research for which 
access was agreed. (b) Please provide copies of any policy document on 
granting of researcher access to COPFS. 
COPFS responded: “The information you have requested is not recorded by the COPFS, 
therefore, in terms of Section 17 of FOISA COPFS does not hold the information you have 
requested.”  Thus, it would appear that, there is not a standard researcher access policy 
operating within COPFS and only a limited number of researchers have had access over the 
last forty years. Whilst there are limited examples of access and participation of COPFS 
employees in research, the researcher was not able to compare this versus the number of 
requests for access made to COPFS.177 
4.2 Case Marking in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands operates a system for the automatic grading of offences to standardise the 
options available to the prosecutor in a particular case, called the BOS - Polaris System. 
Polaris directs a prosecutor by the application of points to each aspect of the offending 
behaviour and particulars of the offence.  The guidelines and points-based system are 
publicly available, and any person with the full facts of the case can examine how the system 
is applied to particular circumstances.  Each offence by its nomen juris is categorised and 
awarded a number of points; aggravating circumstances are applied, and points allocated 
based on the degree of aggravation and the accused’s criminal record is applied with further 
points being accumulated where relevant.  In addition, any mitigating circumstances can be 
applied, resulting in a reduction in the number of points. 
Tak gives an example of the application of the Polaris System:178  
 
 
177 The researcher is aware of some recent research projects where representatives from COPFS have 
participated, the researcher could not establish access for substantive and wide ranging access since Moody 
and Tombs. See For example: Leverick and Duff, Adjournments of Summary Criminal Cases in the Sheriff 
Courts (2008), Leverick, Chalmers and Duff, An Evaluation of the Pilot Victim Statement Schemes in 
Scotland (2007) 







Assault 12 Points 
Injury sustained (Light injury no medical 
treatment) + 3 Points 
Injury sustained (Medical Treatment 
required) + 8 Points 
Injury sustained (specialist medical 
treatment required) + 21 Points 
Injury sustained (Severe Injury) + 35 Points 
Assault with blunt weapon + 7 Points 
Assault with stabbing + 17 Points 
Assault with firearm + 52 Points 
Assault (With Sporting Event aggravation) 
+ 25% added to 
total 
Assault on Public Servant, professional in 
course of their duties or where victim was a 
person trying to prevent an assault 
Total points are 
doubled 
Assault committed against a victim in a 
dependent relationship with accused 
+ 33% added to 
total 
Victim was arbitrarily chosen by accused 
+ 25% added to 
total 
 
The points are added together, with a balancing calculation applied, and not all points are 
fully counted in directing the prosecutor to the outcome.  Points up to 180 are fully counted, 
between 181 and 540 are halved, and anything above 541 is quartered. In the application of 
the guidelines, each point is a fine of 22 Euro, one day of imprisonment or two hours of 
community service.  The prosecutor then applies the guidelines to the options for proceeding 




points, the prosecutor may only use a task penalty. Above 61 points, there will be an 
indictment.179 
As stated in Chapter 3, the prosecutor in the Netherlands is permitted to depart from the 
guidelines. A written reason must be recorded for doing so and where there is a significant 
departure from the guidelines the chief prosecutor is accountable to the Minister of Justice 
for justifying any such divergence. 
A further protective measure is built into the system of the Netherlands in the form of the 
judiciary.  In 1990, the Dutch High Court stated that the propriety of deviation from the 
guidelines is a question of law, not fact.180  The Dutch High Court stated that if these 
guidelines for prosecutors have the status as if they were law, then a judge is entitled to 
examine the activities of the public prosecutor in every case to ensure compliance with the 
guidelines.  In Scotland, the guidelines are not published and are guarded against publication, 
nor do they have the status as being treated as law.  
It is suggested that the system in the Netherlands, and a standardised system of case marking, 
allows for transparency and accountability of the decision-making processes of the 
prosecutor without removing the discretionary elements. An automated system allows for 
comparisons in the application of the scoring system between the regional prosecutors’ 
offices.  This ability allows for transparency, quality control and management of the 
decision-making processes. 
In addition, a defence agent can advise a client on the likely outcome of a case and the 
options in the particular circumstances by application of the guidelines. This system enables 
the defence agent to provide advice to the accused concerning the likelihood of success in 
challenging a decision of the public prosecutor through the appeals process before the client 
accepts/rejects an offer of an alternative. 
Whilst it is outwith the scope of this research, it is suggested that precise early advice to an 
accused person may lead to an earlier resolution of particular cases.  It may be the case that 
 
179 See: ibid at 9.6. 
180 ‘Hoge Raad, 19 June 1990’ (Nederlandse Juriprudentie, 1991) 
https://www.navigator.nl/document/id34199006192317nj1991119dosred/ecli-nl-hr-1990-zc8556-nj-1991-




alongside early disclosure of evidence and a full understanding of case marking decisions 
by defence agents, it would be likely to reduce case elongation and late pleas.181   
The transparent process in the Netherlands enables both victims and accused persons to 
develop an understanding, or at least be given advice, on the likely outcome of a criminal 
complaint.  This process underpins and enables an appeals system to operate for both the 
accused and the victim in criminal offences in the Netherlands. The table below shows the 
number of appeals against a prosecutor’s decision which resulted in the case being heard in 
court.  
Table 5 - % of Opposed Cases (Netherlands) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Registered 
court criminal 
cases 210,565 212,325 191,450 190,850 172,265 170,235 188,105 
Total decisions 
by the Public 
Prosecution 
Service 224,330 221,805 203,875 202,530 185,030 181,210 192,670 
Summons 107,505 109,590 106,005 105,280 99,505 97,400 95,160 
Calls to court in 
response to 
opposition 1520 2145 1255 2175 1210 1955 1025 
Total 
Alternatives 115,305 110,070 96,615 95,070 84,315 81,855 96,495 
% of Cases 
Opposed for 
Alternative as 
% of all 
Alternatives 1.32% 1.95% 1.30% 2.29% 1.44% 2.39% 1.06% 
% of Cases 
Opposed for 
Alternative as 
% of Total 
Cases 0.72% 1.01% 0.66% 1.14% 0.69% 1.15% 0.54% 
 
4.3 Consistency in Scotland 
The system in Scotland requires that an individual prosecutor considers each offence which 
is marked, and decisions are taken by an individual within or outwith the Lord Advocate’s 
 
181 See Justice Committee The Scottish Parliament, ‘Role and Purpose of the Crown Office and Procurator 
Fiscal Service’ (2017), at 28. See also Jenia Iontcheva Turner, ‘Transparency in Plea Bargaining’ (2021) 96, 
973. Discussing transparency in plea negotiation in the USA and the dangers of procedures behind closed 
doors.  See further, Fiona Leverick, ‘Plea and Confession Bargaining in Scotland’, Report to the XVIIth 




guidance.  Whilst the COPFS publishes the factors taken into consideration when making 
decisions on a particular case,182 COPFS will not publish prosecutor guidelines as it may: 
 allow(ing) offenders to circumvent the law by restricting their offending to 
conduct which falls short of a prosecution threshold or, for example, a threshold 
which determines the prosecution forum.183    
It is respectfully suggested that this statement gives rise to a criticism of the decision-making 
process in and of itself.  If the fear of publishing the guidance is that offenders may moderate 
their behaviour to less serious offences to avoid prosecution or only commit offences for 
which they will only receive a warning letter, then this should lead to a reduction in serious 
offending.  It may be suggested that this would be a societal good. However, this fear could 
also be alleviated if guidelines recognised persistent minor offending and would lead to an 
escalation of the prosecutor’s case management decision.184    
Although the prosecution service in Scotland permits the victim to formally request a review 
of a decision, it is difficult to understand the basis on which an argument could be made that 
the decision is flawed based on policy, guidelines, or misuse of discretion when the 
guidelines which inform the decision-making process are not publicly available.  It may be 
the case that this leads to a situation where a victim of crime requests a review of a decision, 
and it is limited in its force as there can be no factual basis to disagree other than to say that 
the unqualified victim is unhappy with the decision. The victim review process and the 
consideration of the victim in criminal complaints are considered further in Chapter 5. 
Furthermore, there is no formal basis on which an accused can request a review if they 
believe a prosecutor’s decision is: fundamentally unfair; fails to apply the Lord Advocate’s 
guidance properly; or that they are being treated substantially different to another person 
who has committed the same offence, in similar circumstances.  For example:  Person A is 
charged with a section 38 offence under the Criminal Justice Licencing (Scotland) Act 2010 
by shouting and swearing in a public place.  Person B and C are both charged with the same 
offence.  All persons have no criminal record, and all facta probanda are the same. In this 
 
182 See Chapter 2.1 
183 ibid. 
184 See Chalmers and Leverick (n 162), Section – Communication to Offenders, which highlights the 




situation it is possible, in Scotland, that Person A may be offered an alternative, Person B 
informed that no proceedings would take place and a Person C is summonsed to court.  The 
only option open to Person A is to reject the offer of an alternative and elect to go to court.185 
Does this happen in Scotland? Within the limits of this research, it is not possible to answer 
that question definitively other than to say it is possible.  It is significant that since 1993, the 
powers of the procurator to use alternative disposals have increased significantly with no 
quality management process or significant public scrutiny of their effectiveness.186 
Furthermore, in the case of prosecutor warning letters, the accused has no right to protest 
innocence of the conduct alleged, there is no route of appeal and no methodology to reach 
an independent tribunal, which it may be suggested is not compliant with Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  According to the Prosecution Policy and Guidance, 
the public interest test and the sufficiency test must be met prior to the issuing of the fiscal 
warning letter.187 There is no requirement for the admission of guilt by the accused.  There 
is a presumption of guilt made by the prosecutor in the issuing of the letter. 
It may be that there being no methodology for an accused person to reject a fiscal warning 
letter and have the case heard before an independent and impartial tribunal, for the accused 
to seek a declaration that they are not guilty of the criminal offence, is problematic for the 
Scottish system.188 Whether or not an accused person would seek to instigate the case calling 
in court and any perceived risk which this may have is another matter, but for the integrity 
of the Scottish system, this is a matter which requires to be addressed.189 
The Richards’s Evaluation190 raised in their interviews that Justice of the Peace (JPs) members of 
the judiciary raised significant concerns about the widening of the powers of the fiscal direct 
measures as a failure to appreciate the nature of the offending behaviour, the measures required 
to reduce the likelihood of re-offending and address the causes of the offending behaviour.  
Indeed, JPs suggested that this consideration was not even part of the consideration of a fiscal 
 
185 See Fionda (n 1) on the public prosecutor’s discretion. 
186 RM White considered Alternatives to prosecution in 2008 and 2009, alongside the Richards et al 
evaluation published in 2011 
187 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, (n 161). 
188 See 3.4 on compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
189 The Scottish Parliament (n 29). 





imposing an alternative.  It requires to be stated however that whilst the JPs objected in principle 
to the widening of the fiscal’s power, which necessarily impacts on the volume of work in the JP 
court, they were less critical of the increase in scope of the Police powers, which in all likelihood 
would have been dealt with by the “old style” fiscal fines.  Conversely some of the JP focus groups 
in this evaluation suggested that more serious offences were being prosecuted in the JP court.   
Further information presented from the Richards’s evaluation raises issues of gender when being 
offered various types of direct measures and highlights that further research after a more 
longitudinal period has passed since the Richards’s review, to properly contribute to the 
consideration of effectiveness and legitimacy of the use of direct measures.191 
The Richards’s evaluation also raises the suggestion that Fiscals considered the nature of 
offending behaviour, previous alternative disposals and wider social circumstances of the 
offender.  It is difficult to understand how a fiscal could be in possession of all the facts that a 
court would be aware of at sentencing via a social enquiry report.  Issues included in the 
evaluation highlight the financial capability of the offender to make payments to the fine, 
whereby information and the personal circumstances would be known to a court imposing a 
financial penalty.  The nature and extent of enquiries made by fiscals into the offender and 
offending behaviour are unclear and require further examination in this study to properly 
examine whether there is a prospective of contributing to addressing the underlying causes of 
offending behaviour, although the fiscal does have the power to divert to other services, it is 
unclear from previous research how, when and why these decisions are reached or actually 
used.192   
One of the significant concerns raised in various anecdotal pieces are that DMs are being used 
multiple times against the same offenders.  This anecdotal evidence continues to be heard in the 
agent’s room and in self-evidenced pieces published.  The statistics from 2008 – 2009 contained in 
the Richard’s evaluation does not support the anecdotal evidence, however the one year period 
of data is limited and lacks the data to conduct a proper analysis.  This research considers the data 
available over a ten year period.  The data from 2008 – 2009 requires comment in that offenders 
receiving more than 2 DM was only 1.78% of cases, the crown office data does not present 
information as to the jurisdiction on where the DM was issued from to highlight any regional 
discrepancies either procedurally or in practice. 
Further information contained in the Richards’s evaluation notes that in the small print of a Police 
DMs and in the fiscal letter notes that the accepting of the penalty will not appear in criminal 
 
191 See Chapter 4 for discussion and examination of the consistency of the offer of an alternative. 
192 See Chapter 2.5 of the circumstances where an offender assessment is undertaken during a diversion from 




records search but may be available to the court for a period of two years.  The accused person is 
informed that the DM will be disclosed under enhanced disclosure in terms of Part V of the Police 
Act 1997.  It is unclear in the Richard’s evaluation what understanding accused persons have of 
enhanced disclosure or indeed the possible impact that an acceptance of such a measure could 
have on future careers particularly in professions whereby PVG scheme registration is required.  
The research undertaken here examines this issue in some detail and reports on the challenges to 
this disclosure scheme has under the European Convention of Human Rights and to the proper 
and full rehabilitation of offenders. 
The Richard’s evaluation highlights via the JP working group that person familiar with the criminal 
justice system or persons who have made early access to an agent to act on their behalf may have 
an opportunity to make representations in respect of the DM and highlights the significant 
inequality of arms which exists between the court process and the process involved in the DM.  
The Richard’s evaluation does not draw any evidence or conclusions from this belief other than 
making the statement.  Further information and studies are required to fully understand the 
process and defects which may or may not exist in this process and any resulting effects. 
Consideration in the evaluation to the public perception of DMs and other sentencing lacks insight 
in the report and is considered merely in three paragraphs (5.11 – 5.13), this research has 
included significant research with the victims of crime and the wider public.  It is worth noting an 
important sentence in the evaluation at 5.13 whereby fiscals had stated that the public did not 
understand that the case might go to court to be deserted by the Crown.  The evaluation does not 
consider this important sentence any further. This, potentially, gives rise to an allegation that 
COPFS are using alternatives in cases which ultimately would have been abandoned.  This requires 
further significant information and research to fully understand this aspect of the use of 
Alternatives. 
The conclusions section of the evaluation only dedicates one paragraph to the interests of justice 
and fairness towards the accused person but offers only anecdotal examples and a generalised 
comment of information sharing being a widespread problem.  The significance for this research 
being that the interests of justice and fairness towards the accused/victims and society.  It is 
unsurprising given the apparent motives towards an economic model that there is not a fuller 
longitudinal study into the likelihood of the innocent accepting alternatives to prosecution and 
the implications that this has for society and our criminal justice system, if indeed it can be 




the value of fairness are reinterpreted from an obligation on the state to prove its case, to an 
obligation on an accused to take positive action to invoke judicial process.” 193 
4.4 Inspection Service in Scotland 
In Scotland, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prosecution (HMIPS) has as its aim “to enhance the 
quality of service provided by and secure public confidence in the COPFS through 
independent inspection and evaluation to enhance the effectiveness of and to promote 
excellence in the prosecution service in Scotland.”194 To date, there has not been a study or 
inspection undertaken by HMIPS to understand the consistency of decision-making 
processes concerning the use of alternatives to prosecution and the application of the Lord 
Advocate’s guidelines.   
The Thematic Report on the use of fiscal fines195 in and the Thematic Report on the use of 
compensation orders196 both raised concerns and made recommendations concerning the 
application of alternatives to particular cases.  There is no available report on the 
applicability of the guidelines, the consistency of application of the guidelines or the 
effective and consistent use of the alternatives to prosecution.   
The creation of the HMIPS seems to raise at least an inspection profile, the limited 
publication of information may imply a lack of proper scrutiny of prosecutorial decisions.  
Indeed, the concerns of the former Solicitor General of Scotland, in 1980, appear not to have 
been fully addressed in the way that such public services are subject to scrutiny: 
When the system accords the public prosecutor a discretion, it must also create 
machinery for guarding against its abuse, whether corruptly or misguidedly.  
Answerability to Parliament is not the only possibility; the courts or the 
Ombudsman could provide the check.197 
 
193 R.M. White, “The Summary Criminal Proceedings(Abolition) (Scotland) Act 2007? A Critical view of 
Part 3 of the Criminal Proceedings Etc (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007” 2008 Juridical Review 215. p.240 
194  Scottish Executive, ‘Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland: About Us’ 
https://www.webarchive.org.uk/wayback/archive/20180528124331/http://www.gov.scot/about/public-
bodies/ipis/about-us accessed 18 October 2020. 
195 Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland (n 33). 
196 Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland, ‘Summary Justice Reform Thematic Report on the Use of 
Compensation Offers and Combined Fiscal Fines and Compensation Offers’ (2010).  




Indeed, in the Scottish Parliament Justice Committee investigation,198 concerns were 
raised about the independence of the inspectorate in their policy of “routinely employing 
seconded or former COPFS staff.”199   
4.5 Scottish Statistical Analysis 
In the period 2010/11 - 2019/20, the use of the fiscal fine dropped significantly and 
generically across all fiscal offices in Scotland as a percentage of the total alternative 
disposals issued with a rise in the use of the combined fine and compensation order.  A 
sample of four offices is given below: 



























of disposals 3267 3066 6170 5048 18410 9033 4406 3390 
Fiscal Warning 
Letter 17% 6.22% 13.58% 12.04% 19.16% 11.98% 20.23% 10.40% 
Fiscal Fine 54.93% 52.51% 50.47% 29.52% 52.11% 43.62% 34.53% 26.32% 
Compensation 
Order 1.63% 0.97% 2.04% 1.55% 1.28% 0.95% 3.34% 0.65% 
Combined 
Fine and 
Compensation 3.65% 9.65% 1.88% 9.71% 1.71% 7.90% 10.93% 20.74% 
 
 
198 The Scottish Parliament (n 168). 




It is difficult, given the lack of available statistical information, to understand the rationale 
of the drop in the use of particular methods of alternative disposals or indeed, the reasoning 
behind each change.  Further understanding of these changes in the last ten years is required.  
It is crucial to understand if these changes have developed due to particular regional concerns 
around particular offending behaviour and policy decisions have been taken to take a hard-
line approach against particular offending, or whether it is due to individual prosecutor 
preference.    
Significant shifts in the use of alternatives over the period and wide variations in the use 
during the period, suggest that the variance gives rise to the potential of similar offences 
being treated differently in each fiscal office area.  The number of cases whereby an 
alternative was used has generally remained the same; however, there are wide variations 
and changes in the use of particular alternatives to prosecution, for example, Edinburgh 
reports a drop of 20.95% in the use of the fiscal fine and Glasgow an 8.49% drop. 
When examining each regional office in the table above we can see that the use of the 
combined fiscal fine and compensation order varies widely between the offices, with the 
Aberdeen Fiscal’s office using the combined offer in 9.65% of cases and Hamilton using the 
same alternative in 20.74% of cases. 
Further analysis of the breakdown per prosecutor’s office reveals between 2010 and 2020 
the vast majority of local procurator fiscal offices, 26 offices, report a percentage rise in the 
number of reports offered an alternative to prosecution and only 14 offices reporting a drop 
in the percentage of cases whereby an alternative to prosecution was offered.200 
Whilst the majority of local prosecutors’ offices report a rise in alternative usage, there was 
not a material rise in overall percentage terms. The percentage of the alternatives used in the 
overall number of cases, does not suggest a significant rise in the use of alternatives in the 
examined period:  26.41% in 2010/2011 and 27.61% in 2019/2020.  This change does 
represent a rise in the number of cases where an alternative was used.  It is noteworthy that 
the number of cases reported to the public prosecutor fell significantly during the same 
period from 276,000 to 171,000.201 
 
200 Data available as a result of an FOI Request (October 2020) to COPFS. 




What cannot be explained by this research is the significant variation between the 
percentages of cases whereby the alternative was considered an appropriate disposal, nor 
indeed can consistency of approach between local prosecutors’ regions be thoroughly 
examined beyond the figures and percentages for each local office.  Examination on the 
nomen juris of the offences reported to each local prosecutor’s office was not possible, as 
COPFS were unable to make this information available. 202  
The basis of this change of suitability, in the majority of local prosecutors’ offices, cannot 
be examined in the context of the prosecution policy by comparing the prosecutor’s code 
available in 2010 and the code in use in the 2018 – 2019 period.   
It would be logical to assume that the drop in offending behaviour in Scotland would have 
led to a reduction in the number of alternatives offered to accused persons, and this is indeed 
the case.  The total number of disposals in the period dropped from 69,989 to 46,805.  In the 
same period the percentage rise of cases whereby an alternative was used, within the confines 
of data which the public prosecutor will release, cannot be logically explained nor can the 
significant variations between local prosecutors’ offices. 
In Scotland, 82% of all persons convicted of offences are male and 18% female. In the use 
of the fiscal fine, 63% of disposals were given to male offenders and 37% to female 
offenders. Therefore, it is possible to draw the inference, concerning fiscal fines, that 
statistically females are given a disproportionate percentage of fiscal fines when compared 
to the conviction rate, based upon gender alone.203   
Considering the nomen juris of an offence, in 2018 – 2019, females were convicted of 2.71% 
of sexual offences but received 16.66% of fiscal fines issued for sexual offences.  In crimes 
of dishonesty, 24.5% of convictions were by female offenders, who received 37% of fiscal 
fines for the offence.  For crimes of fire-raising, vandalism, etc., 13.02% of convictions were 
female, but they received 8% of fiscal fines for such offences.  For common assault, 24.58% 
of convictions were by female offenders, but 29% of fiscal fines for common assault were 
given to female offenders.  For motor vehicle offenders, 18.20% of convictions were by 
 
202 Data available as a result of an FOI Request (September 2020) to COPFS. 
203 ‘Criminal Proceedings in Scotland: 2018-2019’ https://www.gov.scot/publications/criminal-proceedings-




female offenders, but 28.9% of fiscal fines were issued to females.204 It is clear, in 
consideration of the particular nomen juris, female offenders are issued a disproportionally 
high percentage of the fiscal fines issued.  This comparison is naturally not without its 
limitations, as each offence is judged by the particular circumstances with all the relevant 
considerations, as outlined in Chapter 2. However, the abnormality in the statistical analysis 
does lead to questions which, as considered in Chapters 2 and 7 of this research, require 
further empirical data and analysis. 
A criticism of the above analysis may be that the main offence categorisation provided by 
the Scottish Government figures does not allow a direct association on aggravating 
circumstances which may escalate an offence to court proceedings rather than an alternative 
disposal. This criticism, being an accepted criticism of the limited nature of this research, 
requires consideration of the nature and statistics of aggravated offending behaviour.  In 
offences with aggravated offending behaviour, males are statistically more likely to be 
convicted of an aggravated offence, 88% of offences with an aggravation convicted in court 
are male and 12% female.  It may be the case that offending behaviour by females is less 
likely to be aggravated, and this may justify the variation in gender-based disposals.205  This 
suggestion, however, does not provide a full and satisfactory discovery of the use of 
discretion and consistency in the offer of an alternative.  It does not justify beyond question 
the statistical abnormality highlighted in this research.  Further empirical research is required 
to consider the statistics more fully and to draw firm conclusions of this nature.206 
It would appear the inconsistencies, or at least the suggestion of inconsistency, in the data 
requires the Scottish criminal justice system to contemplate the operation of bias, the 
operation of unsuitable net widening and the effectiveness of appropriate checks and 
balances.  In 2015, COPFS introduced a system of centralised case marking in summary 
cases through the creation of the “Initial Case Processing Hub” being located in Stirling, 
Hamilton, and Paisley.  The stated aim of the hubs was to improve consistency at the 
outset of the processing of criminal complaints.207  
 
204 The Scottish Government, (n 19). People Convicted by gender and main offence table 6 and table 21.  
205 ibid, table 12.  
206 See Chapter 7. 




The Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament, in their 2017 review of the COPFS, 
considered the effect of the centralised case processing hubs.  The Committee’s report 
expressly examines the differential opinions on the effect of the centralised processing 
hubs as to the consistency and appropriateness of the approach in particular cases, without 
conducting a detailed review into the issues of consistency and approach raised in 
response to the committee’s call for evidence.  The Committee’s review remains 
superficial in the examination of the concerns raised about consistency and 
appropriateness of disposals in the work of the COPFS.208  It remains the case, at the time 
of writing, that no independent examination of the consistency in case marking by COPFS 
has been undertaken. 
Since the creation of the centralised marking hub, it is clear that the statistical 
abnormalities between the regions examined in Table 6 remain despite the creation of the 
centralised marking hubs and their stated aim of consistency. Table 7 below provides 















Table 7 – Use of Alternatives since the Creation of the Hubs209  (Scotland) 
 
The researcher anticipated examining the use of the alternative to prosecution as related to 
the ethnicity of the accused.  The Scottish Government and COPFS were unable to provide 
a breakdown of the race of persons offered an alternative to prosecution.  The Scottish 
 
209 (n 186). – Calculation and format of this table is the researchers with data from the source. 
Office  Total Alternatives 2016 Total Alternatives 2019 
Change in total numbers of 
alternative disposals used 
Aberdeen 2957 2431 -526 
Edinburgh 4527 3514 -1013 
Glasgow 12928 7009 -5919 
Hamilton 3484 2586 -898 
Office  Warning Letters 2016 % of 
Total 
Warning Letters 2019 % of Total 
Aberdeen 372 12.58% 319 13.12% 
Edinburgh 679 15.00% 608 17.30% 
Glasgow 2526 19.54% 1082 15.44% 
Hamilton 498 14.29% 211 8.16% 




Conditional Offers of Fixed Penalties 
Paid 2019 
% of Total 
Aberdeen 947 32.03% 1037 42.66% 
Edinburgh 623 13.76% 847 24.10% 
Glasgow 1253 9.69% 1186 16.92% 
Hamilton 452 12.97% 228 8.82% 
Office  Fiscal Fines Paid/Accepted 2016 % of 
Total 
Fiscal Fines Paid/Accepted 2019 % of Total 
Aberdeen 1022 34.56% 807 33.20% 
Edinburgh 1521 33.60% 1490 42.40% 
Glasgow 5454 42.19% 3940 56.21% 
Hamilton 1739 49.91% 1780 68.83% 
Office  Compensation Orders Accepted 2016 % of 
Total 
Compensation Orders Accepted 2019 % of Total 
Aberdeen 47 1.59% 20 0.82% 
Edinburgh 75 1.66% 78 2.22% 
Glasgow 136 1.05% 86 1.23% 
Hamilton 27 0.77% 33 1.28% 
Office  Combined Fiscal Fines/Compensation 
Orders Accepted 2016 
% of 
Total 
Combined Fiscal Fines/Compensation 
Orders Accepted 2019 
% of Total 
Aberdeen 123 4.16% 247 10.16% 
Edinburgh 284 6.27% 490 13.94% 
Glasgow 681 5.27% 714 10.19% 




Government state that they do not hold this information as it is not collected.  It is somewhat 
concerning that data essential to examine the fairness and equality of treatment of persons 
in the alternatives to prosecution system is not collected, measured, or examined to ensure 
that compliance with the requirements of Article 7 of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights is ensured or at least monitored. 
Whilst, in the Netherlands, 84% of all criminal offences are committed by male suspects 
and 16% by female offenders.  77% of all alternative disposals are given to male offenders 
and 23% to female offenders.210  Whilst there is still a net difference between male and 
female offenders in the percentage disposals given this difference is significantly smaller 
than the differential in the Scottish statistics.  It is possible to draw the inference that the 
differential between the jurisdictions suggests that the application of the case marking 
methodology in the Netherlands results in a greater standardisation in the outcome as 
between the genders.  This being said, as is stated above, it is not possible to be conclusive 
without further investigation and data being made available in Scotland.211 
A further consideration in the appropriate use of alternative disposals is where the accused 
has previous convictions. The system of the Netherlands automatically applies a calculation 
as part of the case marking decision to ensure that all previous convictions are considered 
appropriately, per the Dutch code.  As discussed above, the COPFS mark cases manually by 
individuals and further the availability of the prosecutors' code is limited.212 Thus, it is not 
possible to consider the consistency of the application of the guidance for the use of 
alternatives to prosecution where an offender has multiple previous alternatives to 
prosecution.  The public perception of the multiple uses of alternatives, with the same 
offenders, is out with the scope of this research. Given the position of the application of the 
guidance in the Netherlands to ensure that escalating and repeat offending is dealt with by 
the court, it is necessary to consider the position in Scotland.   
In Scotland, in 2018-2019, 7,830 offenders with two or more previous alternatives to 
prosecution were given a subsequent alternative to prosecution, with 1,137 of these being 
 
210 Percentage calculation is the researcher’s, calculation based up National Netherlands Statistics, available 
here: https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/83944NED/table?ts=1594642130803. 
211 A breakdown by regional areas in the Netherlands was not possible as all regional stats are stored 
centrally and reported as one dataset. 




persons with more than six previous offences whereby an alternative was used.213 Table 8 
below, provides further detail: 




Number of previous non-court disposals4 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
2008-09 50,964 4,002 693 201 54 32 23 
2009-10 42,987 7,575 1,858 540 178 98 97 
2010-11 40,801 9,219 2,780 902 338 158 217 
2011-12 44,604 11,681 4,077 1,534 663 272 451 
2012-13 51,234 15,455 6,019 2,551 1,131 499 740 
2013-14 46,327 14,233 6,360 2,957 1,473 726 1,166 
2014-15 34,914 10,617 5,112 2,610 1,474 819 1,314 
2015-16 34,046 10,643 5,297 2,848 1,513 905 1,466 
2016-17 22,844 7,187 3,597 1,985 1,126 680 1,284 
2017-18 22,702 7,052 3,735 2,091 1,169 691 1,229 
2018-19 19,592 5,750 3,150 1,814 1,086 643 1,137 
 
In in the last ten years, 9,124 offenders with six or more previous offences were offered 
alternatives to prosecution.  In 2008/2009 repeated use of alternatives to prosecution 
 




represented 9% of all alternatives used, this figure by 2016/2017 had risen to 41% of 
alternatives used and has been consistently at 41% for the last three years. It is somewhat 
surprising that over 40% of alternatives are given to those with previous alternative 
disposals.  This variance raises questions as to the effectiveness of the methodologies of 
dealing with habitual offenders. 
What is the current policy, and how does it apply in consideration of the statistical 
information above?  Are alternatives to prosecution suitable in cases where there is previous 
offending behaviour, and if so, what should be the policy in their use? As indicated in 
Chapter 1, an examination of the policy as it stands at present was not possible and neither 
was an examination of the historical development of the policy. An examination of the above 
statistics against the policy has not been possible.  What is clear, however, from the Scottish 
Government 2011 report is that alternatives to prosecution were accepted as proportionate, 
particularly for first-time offenders.214 The concern that alternatives to prosecution acting as 
a deterrent to persistent offenders are less effective highlights the need for a re-examination 
of the use of alternatives to prosecution whereby the same offender has had this disposal on 
multiple occasions.215 
The continued development of administrative justice, has the potential to be problematic as 
suggested by Fionda: 
Allowing administrative justice to progress to such an extent, no matter how 
necessary or desirable…. risks abuse of power by the prosecutor. Rights of 
defendants to a fair hearing, the opportunity to defend the charges made against 
them and appeals against the justice of the ‘conviction’ or the severity of the 
sentence may be overlooked, and the temptation for the prosecutor to enter into 
a bargain with the defence to avoid a trial in a case where the guilt of the accused 
is in doubt may be overwhelming. 216 
 
214 ibid. (n 84) at 5.6. 
215  (n 84). at 5.15. 





In this chapter a statistical comparison has been conducted between the systems of the 
Netherlands and that of Scotland, the systems of case marking in both jurisdictions, and 
considered the consistency in the offer of an alternative to prosecution.  Whilst it is not 
possible to draw definitive conclusions on areas for development in the Scottish system it 
remains clear that there are areas of concern regarding the consistency in the offer of an 
alternative to prosecution.  The protective measures built into the system of the 
Netherlands appears to offer a greater balance than that which is presently operating in 
Scotland.217 
The consistency and quality of decision-making processes bring confidence and public trust 
in a system.218 For alternatives to prosecution to succeed in their stated aims in the justice 
system, consistency, fairness, and transparency must be fundamental aspects of the decision-
making process.   
This need is particularly the case where the impact on the victim of crime is considered but 
also for the viability of the continued public support of the criminal justice system in 
Scotland.219   
The finding in the 2011 report on alternatives to prosecution in Scotland states that: 
On balance, the concerns raised are outweighed by the weight of positive 
evidence gathered by this evaluation on the day-to-day operation of DMs (Direct 
Measures).220 
Any future development of the alternatives system in Scotland requires not just an 
economic advantage but an improvement to the system of alternatives for all stakeholders 
in the criminal justice system. 
  
 
217 See Chapter 3 regarding the right of appeal against decisions of the prosecutor. 
218 See Valerie Braithwaite, ‘Communal and Exchange Trust Norms, Their Value Base and Relevance to 
Institutional Trust’, Trust and Goverance (Russell Sage Foundation 1998), at 46.  
219 See Chapter 5. 





Chapter 5: Alternative disposals and consideration of the Victim 
This research has considered the use of alternatives, punishment, and the operation of the 
public prosecutor in both jurisdictions. This chapter considers the victim of crime in the 
context of alternative disposals.  It compares and contrasts differences in the approach of 
Scotland and the Netherlands in respect of the role of the victim in the alternative disposal 
systems. The purpose of considering the victim, in respect of alternative disposals is so that 
Scotland can:  
provide a platform for mature reflection on the direction we in Scotland now 
take to better support and care for victims of crime. Their collective experiences 
deserve careful consideration and a response from the criminal justice system – 
and wider society – which is sensitive to their needs and respectful of their 
individual experience and trauma.221 
Successive Scottish Governments have made significant statements regarding the victims 
of crime and the services offered to victims to enable them to feel supported by the 
criminal justice system.  As a result of these policy decisions, there have been various 
measures introduced to recognise the harm that a victim experiences by the very nature of 
being a victim of crime.  These measures include the creation by the Scottish Government 
of the Victims’ Taskforce, whose primary role is “to coordinate and drive action to 
improve the experiences of victims and witnesses within the criminal justice system.”222 
The Scottish Government currently invests around £18 million per year in supporting 
victims of crime. 223  This investment includes funding of services such as Victim Support 
Scotland.  In the last twenty years, there have been significant investment and 
developments in the understanding of, engagement with, and support offered to victims of 
crime. These have significantly improved in the last twenty years, and indeed further 
 
221 Lesley Thomson, ‘Review of Victim Care in the Justice Sector in Scotland. Report and 
Recommendations’ (2017). 
222 The Scottish Government, ‘Victims Taskforce’ https://www.gov.scot/groups/victims-taskforce/ accessed 
18 October 2020. The Victims Taskforce was established in 2018. 
223 The Scottish Government, ‘Victims and Witnesses’ https://www.gov.scot/policies/victims-and-witnesses/ 




significant actions have been developed and implemented in the criminal justice system in 
the last five years. 
Fionda224 suggests that the criminal justice system must recognise that the victim is entitled 
to consideration in a process that is ordinarily offender orientated.  Fionda further suggests 
that this is achieved by the application of a restorative philosophy whereby sentencing 
options such as compensation and the victim’s satisfaction with the outcome of a particular 
case may be considered as a primary objective. 
Criticisms, in the alternative disposal system, in respect of victim care are suggested by 
Christie: 
The victim is a particularly heavy loser in this situation. Not only has he 
suffered, lost materially, or become hurt, physically or otherwise…. but above 
all he has lost participation in his own case.  It is the crown that comes into the 
spotlight, not the victim. 225 
This research considers the position of the victim in the alternative disposal system and 
gives focus to the differences between the two jurisdictions.  These differences are 
considered so that the comparison may draw out features of victim care which may offer 
an opportunity to address the criticisms of Christie and offer developments to the Scottish 
system. 
5.1 The Rights of the Victim 
In Scotland, the rights of the victim are contained within the Victim Code.226   The code 
confirms that the victim has the right, if the case is not prosecuted, to be told the reasons 
why and to request a review of that decision.   
The Lord Advocate has produced guidance on the implementation by COPFS of section 4 
of the Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014.  This guidance outlines how a victim 
may request a review of the decision not to prosecute an accused person and how this will 
 
224 Fionda (n 1). 
225 Nils Christie, ‘Conflicts as Property’ (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 1. 
226 The Scottish Government, ‘Victims’ Code for Scotland’  https://mygov.scot/victims-code-scotland 




be handled.  There are areas of the decision-making process which are excluded from the 
request to review a decision, including the use of a “direct measure.”227 
Duff suggests when referencing the position of the accused rights, that they:  
are at times no more than rhetorical devices which vary in their degree and 
weight during differing stages of the justice system, depending on other 
competing values which have to be incorporated.228  
This argument may be extended to the rights of victims in the criminal justice system in 
Scotland, such as in the use of alternative measures to dispose of complaints quickly and 
efficiently. 
At present in Scotland the victim’s right to review is limited, significantly, to only those 
cases whereby a decision to take no further action has been made as outlined above.  From 
the data available,229 the volume of the victim’s right to review cases would generally be 







227 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, (n 41). 
228 Peter Duff, ‘The Agreement of Uncontroversial Evidence and the Presumption of Innocence: An Insoluble 
Dilemma?’ (2002) 6 Edinburgh Law Review 25. 
229 https://www.copfs.gov.uk/publications/statistics - Accessed 10th September 2020 – To access, click 
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2019 18,861 183 0.97% 21 11% 162 89% 
2017-
2018 22,209 214 0.96% 20 9% 194 91% 
2016-
2017 29,937 166 0.55% 17 10% 149 90% 
Three 
Year 
Average 23,669 188 0.79% 19 10% 168 90 % 
 
It is essential to recognise that the current system in Scotland permits a victim right to 
review when the decision has been to take no further action.  Applying the calculated the 
three-year average above and the percentage of the decisions overturned to cases where an 
alternative was used allows the researcher to assess the potential impact of extending the 
victim right to review to include those cases where the intended action by the prosecutor is 
the use of an alternative. 
In consideration of the same three-year period, the potential number of reviews generated 
by the extension of the Victim Right to Review, using the three-year average in the 


















2018-2019 35,597 0.79% 281 253 28 
2017-2018 41,835 0.79% 330 297 33 
2016-2017 41,825 0.79% 330 297 33 
Potential 
Three-year 
Average 39,752  0.79% 314 283 31 
 
Any extension of the victim right to review has a consequence to the economic cost of 
running the public prosecution service in Scotland.  Given the economic position, we must 
consider the broader implications of the improvement of victim care in Scotland.  In this 
research, it is a fundamental aim to seek developments in the justice system in Scotland 
where improvements can be justified. 
There may be one further option available to a victim to have a decision of the public 
prosecutor reviewed via the Judicial Review mechanism.  The court, in a judicial review, 
utilises its inherent power to review a decision of a public body.  The scope of the Judicial 
Review in Scotland is explained in West v Secretary of State for Scotland.230 
The following propositions are intended therefore to define the principles by 
reference to which the competency of all applications to the supervisory 
jurisdiction under Rule of Court 260B is to be determined: 
1. The Court of Session has power, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, 
to regulate the process by which decisions are taken by any person or body to 
 




whom a jurisdiction, power or authority has been delegated or entrusted by 
statute, agreement or any other instrument. 
2. The sole purpose for which the supervisory jurisdiction may be exercised is 
to ensure that the person or body does not exceed or abuse that jurisdiction, 
power or authority or fail to do what the jurisdiction, power or authority requires. 
3. The competency of the application does not depend upon any distinction 
between public law and private law, nor is it confined to those cases which 
English law has accepted as amenable to judicial review, nor is it correct in 
regard to issues about competency to describe judicial review under Rule of 
Court 260B as a public law remedy. 
In the last twenty years, there has only been one petition for a judicial review of a decision 
not to prosecute.  The unreported case of Szula v Her Majesty’s Advocate231 concerned the 
decision not to prosecute an allegation of historical sexual abuse. This petition did not 
proceed to a full Judicial Review hearing based on senior counsel’s advice to the pursuer 
before the commencement of the hearing.  Therefore, the court has not pronounced on 
whether a judicial review is available as a method of redress against a decision of the 
public prosecutor.  The pursuer, in this case, did seek to take the case to the European 
Court of Human Rights232; however, this was rejected by the court at the application stage. 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights places a positive obligation on the 
State to have in place a legal framework which protects the physical and psychological 
integrity of each person.233 Whilst it has never been argued, to date, in a Scottish Court that 
this failure to have a formal redress to an independent tribunal against a decision of the 
public prosecutor is a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention, it may be 
considered arguable.  The failure to have the formal independent redress scheme may, 
given the psychological impact of such decisions, be found to be a failure to protect the 
psychological integrity of each person and thus be a breach of Article 8. Naturally, the 
more serious the offending behaviour is and the greater the impact on the victim, the higher 
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the likelihood that the failure to provide the independent tribunal would be found to be a 
breach of Article 8. 
5.2 Victim Representation in Scotland 
The Thomson review found that despite many attempts to improve the treatment of victims 
of crime by the criminal justice system in Scotland, the level of dissatisfaction among 
victims of crime remained high. 234  The review considered the tensions between the 
independent prosecution service making decisions in the public interest which are not 
always compatible with the victim’s interests.  Thomson recommends that further work is 
undertaken to “recognise the victim’s needs as the priority, rather than, potentially, a 
competing priority.”235  The Thomson review did not consider the impact on the victim of 
prosecutorial decisions, but widely considers the impact of being a victim of a crime and 
entering the criminal justice system in Scotland as a victim and, potentially, a witness in 
proceedings.   
In consideration of the competing pressures and tensions, it may be that the organisation 
making the prosecution decision, and potentially being subject of a victim request to 
review, cannot be the independent and supportive decision-maker concerning the victim 
due to a direct conflict of interest.236  As Thomson points out, often, the victim is unhappy 
to discover “that the public prosecutor is not their lawyer.”237   
Consideration is not given in The Thomson review as to methods of facilitating the victim 
to feel that they have a voice and are represented in proceedings or pre-trial proceedings 
particularly where a prosecutor decides to offer an alternative to prosecution or not to 
proceed with prosecution at all. 
The courts in Scotland have expressly criticised the conduct of the prosecution in 
consulting the victim in the process of accepting a plea.  Fox v HM Advocate238, obiter, the 
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court states that involvement in the discussions relating to a tendering of a plea with 
witnesses, and thus by extension complainers, is an irregularity and should not occur and 
indeed may in particular circumstances materially prejudice any future trial.   
McPherson highlights in her research that defence agents have raised particular concern on 
the prominence and potential influence which a victim or their family can play in the 
Crown’s decision-making process with Senior Counsel in that research suggesting that: 
[The] prosecution have gone from simply a position to inform, and to keep 
informed the victim’s family, almost at times to a point of effectively 
consulting with them as to whether a plea in such and such circumstances is a 
good idea. Or worse, well maybe not worse, but certainly equally as badly, not 
making decisions which are correct in law because they fear some sort of 
backlash from the deceased’s family in the press.239 
The conflicting role of the Crown and its agents is to be contrasted between the clear and 
distinctive role of the defence solicitor, whom Kiser suggests, has two prominent roles. 240  
Firstly, to act as the advocate for the accused by representing them and secondly to provide 
legal advice. 
In the context of sexual offending and the leading of sexual history evidence this has been 
given particular consideration as Raitt notes in her research considering the case for 
independent representation for complainers in sexual offence cases:  
Prosecutors cannot press the complainer’s interests above the interests of others. 
They cannot take instructions directly from a complainer. There is no lawyer-
client relationship between a prosecutor and a complainer – and thus none of the 
characteristics of that relationship are based upon trust, confidentiality, and 
legitimate partisanship. The Crown’s role as a public prosecutor and officer of 
the court inevitably restricts the scope for supporting the complainer. [This 
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Victim’s] interests are subordinated to wider concerns, possibly without even the 
opportunity of being canvassed before a judge.241 
The conflict between the public interest role of the prosecutor and the victim comes into 
sharp contrast when their duty prevents the prosecutor from discussing aspects of a case 
with a victim.  The Inspectorate of Prosecution in Scotland has acknowledged this conflict: 
[m]any victims erroneously assume that their relationship with the prosecutor 
is comparable to that between the accused and his/her lawyer. This is not the 
case. The public prosecutor acts independently in the public interest. 
Assessment of the public interest involves consideration of competing interests, 
including the interests of the victim, the accused and the wider community. 
Prosecuting in the public interest prevents the prosecutor from discussing 
certain aspects of the evidence with the victim during the investigation or at 
any court proceedings.242 
It has been recognised that the Crown cannot adequately represent the victim in criminal 
proceedings.  In the case of WF, Petitioner243 the Court expressly recognised that it was 
not for the Crown to represent the complainer in the application to recover medical records 
in criminal proceedings and certainly the defence agent would not be in a position to do so.  
It was necessary, to protect the victim’s Article 8 right under the European Convention of 
Human Rights, that the victim be represented in proceedings.244   
The court in RR v HMA245 imposed an obligation on the COPFS to expressly seek the 
complainers’ views in relation to any application engaging the aforementioned Article 8 
rights and thus, it may be suggested, has further highlighted the express conflict between 
the duties of the public prosecutor and the needs of the victim.  This will particularly be the 
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case whereby the prosecutor requires to lead evidence covered by the victim’s Article 8 
rights, but the views of the victim are contrary to the public interest and evidential tests 
applied by the public prosecutor. 
In her research, when considering the role the Crown has in sexual offences, Raitt further 
highlights that there is an “awkward juxtaposition of the two distinct roles that the 
prosecutor is expected to fulfil.” 246  Firstly, highlighting the duty incumbent on the 
prosecutor to ensure that the accused is treated fairly within the criminal justice system and 
secondly that the Crown does not represent any individual or victim of crime.   
It remains to be considered whether the distinction in the role of the prosecutor still exists 
considering the development of alternatives in Scotland.  The traditional model of an 
adversarial system is one in which the prosecutor is leading evidence to prove the guilt of 
the accused, and the defence is representing the accused and advocating for them.  The 
increasing variety of alternatives to prosecution and managerialist justice offered by the 
prosecution service gives rise to consideration as to whether the minority criticisms in the 
Stewart report discussed in Chapter 2 have been vindicated. 
5.3 Victim Representation in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, a victim or any person with a direct interest in the case has the right to 
challenge a decision of the public prosecutor formally.247  The EU Directive 2012/29/EU 
required European countries to afford certain rights to victims of crimes; the Dutch 
response was to instigate several developments in the Code of Criminal procedure which 
has a chapter dedicated to the rights of the victim.  
In 2006, the Netherlands introduced access to state-funded legal assistance for the victim in 
criminal proceedings.  The provision of legal aid to a maximum of 1,155 Euro per case for 
the victim’s lawyer, non-means-tested, is to pay for attendance at police interrogations, 
studying the public prosecutor’s file, establishing damages for the victim, drafting a 
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victim’s impact statement and verbal statements to the court and attending/representing the 
victim at the trial.  
In 2016, in the Netherlands, the victim’s right to speak became unlimited, allowing victims 
to state their views on the effect the offence had on them, the culpability of the accused and 
their view on the appropriate sentence which the accused should face.  
The victim in the Netherlands, via the victim solicitor, has certain rights which do not 
presently exist in Scotland.  The victim in the Netherlands has the right to access the case 
file,248 which permits access to all documents which are relevant to them, being the 
complete case file or parts of said file. Further, the prosecutor may provide access to the 
file electronically, in person or provide access to the file under supervision.249 The 
prosecutor can refuse to provide the case file in three circumstances: firstly, access to the 
file would have a severe impact on the victim; secondly, it would hinder the police 
investigation and thirdly could impact on national security.  Prior to denying access to the 
case file, an order must be received from a judge.  On the occasion of a refusal to access 
the case file, the victim can appeal to the court.250 
A further right of the victim in the Netherlands is to add documents to the prosecutor’s 
file.251 The right to add documents to the prosecutor’s file includes such things as medical 
files or reports from expert psychologists to show the impact on the victim.  The prosecutor 
can refuse to include documents in the prosecutor’s file on the same basis as the refusal to 
give access to the file and the right of appeal to the court remains for the victim.252s 
If the victim, or ‘direct interest party’, seeks to challenge the decision, this is filed with the 
Court of Appeal within three months of the decision being reached.  The appeal court has 
the power to overturn the decision of the prosecutor or uphold the decision: 
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If the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear the complaint, the complaint of 
the complainant is admissible, and the Court of Appeal is of the opinion that 
prosecution or further prosecution should have taken place, the Court of Appeal 
shall order institution or continuation of prosecution of the offence to which the 
complaint relates. Unless the Court of Appeal determines otherwise, the 
prosecution may not be instituted or continued by the issuance of a punishment 
order.253 
An appeal is heard administratively in the Court of Appeal or a hearing in chambers.  At a 
hearing in chambers, the victim or direct interest party, the prosecution service and the 
accused may be represented and make oral submissions concerning the appeal.  In an 
administrative decision, written submissions may be made by all parties. 
The government in the Netherlands has invested funds to develop specialised victim 
lawyers to ensure and promote the rights of victims. Elbers et al.254 study in 2020 
concluded that the victims’ lawyer in the courtroom, the victim right of appeal, victim 
access to the case file, the right to claim compensation had made a significant and essential 




The criticisms made by Christie, highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, appear to 
be less relevant in the system of the Netherlands, where there are formal mechanisms at 
every stage of the decision-making process by the public prosecutor where the victim can 
be involved, take action and not lose participation in the case. 
In light of the recent developments of the victim-centred approach in Scotland there have 
been moves to address the harm caused to the victim not only by the offence but also by 
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the disconnect from the proceedings. Herman suggests that the path to recovery for the 
victim is based upon the empowerment of the victim. 
The core experiences of psychological traumas are disempowerment and 
disconnection from others…. Recovery, therefore, is based upon the 
empowerment of the survivor and the creation of new connections.255  
There may be a concern from an economic perspective of introducing any such statutory 
right of appeal for the victim. If a robust, fair, and transparent system is put in place, 
Scotland would improve the system as a whole.  It may lead to independence and 
confidence in an already significantly conflicted relationship, between the public 
prosecutor and the victim.  Scotland ultimately needs to address further the challenges, 
trauma and feelings of dis-empowerment faced by the victims of crime.   
The forgoing analysis of the position in Scotland is not to suggest that an increase in 
victim’s rights in Scotland would automatically lead to a greater punishment focus in 
Scotland being led by victims. Indeed, Simpson’s research on prisons and prison 
alternatives suggests that with education of the public and victims both become less 
inclined towards imprisonment and severe sentencing models and they become more 
supportive of alternative sanctions.  Simpson’s research suggests that both victims and the 
public at large value the principles of equity and fairness in regard to the accused’s 
economic, social, and cultural circumstances.256   
This being suggested, Felson and Pare’s 257 research regarding violence against women 
identified a significant relationship between severity of sentence and victim satisfaction.   
Having considered the position in Scotland regarding the victim’s engagement with 
alternatives recommendations are made in Chapter 7 of this research to develop the system 
in Scotland. 
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Chapter 6: Models of Criminal Justice 
Models provide a useful way to cope with the complexity of the criminal 
process. They allow details to be simplified and common themes and trends to 
be highlighted.258  
The introduction of alternatives to prosecution in Scotland fundamentally changed the 
prosecutorial decision-making process, the methodology of disposing of criminal cases, 
and as such the model of criminal justice which Scotland had until this point been 
operating.259   
This chapter considers the models of criminal justice which may influence the Scottish 
system. Within the limitations of this research, it is not possible to conduct a significant 
exegesis of the variety of promulgated models.  Focus is given to those which have been 
subject of significant academic examination, alongside academic theories which, following 
the literature review, offer an opportunity to consider the alternative disposal system. An 
overview of the principles of the Netherlands approach and development to principles of 
justice is contained within Chapter 3. 
6.1 Packer’s Models of Criminal Justice 
The traditional view of the decision-making process regarding whether or not to prosecute, 
as suggested by Packer,260 offers two models which consider the process and its underlying 
motivations in criminal law.  
The first, the due process, model suggests that the criminal justice system constitutes an 
‘obstacle course’ which a prosecutor must overcome before a conviction should be, or can 
be, satisfactorily achieved.  In the first model, Packer suggests that the system is designed 
to be cautious and allow criminal prosecutions to run their course before an independent 
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tribunal where the presumption of innocence dominates until, if and when, a finding of 
guilt is declared.  
The second of Packer’s models is the crime control model.  This model lays a significant 
focus on the speed and finality of a justice system in the name of an effective and efficient 
criminal justice system.  This second model seeks to process cases and punish offenders at 
the earliest possible opportunity and avoid intricate procedures, disputes, or contentious 
issues.  Indeed, as Packer states: 
It follows that extra-judicial processes should be preferred to judicial 
processes, informal operations to formal ones.  But informality is not enough; 
there must also be uniformity.  Routine, stereotyped procedures are essential if 
large numbers are to be handled.261 
The introduction and frequent use of the alternative disposal methodology prevalent in 
Scotland does not fit easily with Packer’s definitions.262 The mere existence of alternatives 
to prosecution in Scotland indicates that Scotland does not operate within Packer's first 
model.  The suggestion, which could logically be drawn by the existence of alternatives to 
prosecution in Scotland, is that Scotland operates the second of Packer’s models.   
This suggestion cannot be substantiated, however, as the prosecutor must navigate the 
obstacle course of principles and rules that exist in Scotland before the imposition of an 
alternative to prosecution. Scotland seeks to maintain the integrity of the rules and 
procedural policies whilst seeking efficiency in using alternatives to prosecution.  This can 
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On receipt of a report alleging that a criminal offence has been committed, 
Procurators Fiscal must apply the test for prosecutorial action set out in the 
published Prosecution Code. The first step is to consider whether the report 
describes a crime known to the law of Scotland. Thereafter, the prosecutor 
must decide if there is sufficient evidence to establish the essential facts of the 
case i.e., there must be two sources of evidence which indicate that the crime 
was committed and that the accused person was the perpetrator. Without 
sufficient evidence in law, the Procurator Fiscal cannot take prosecutorial 
action. Finally, assuming that the first two questions are answered 
affirmatively, the prosecutor must decide what action, if any, best serves the 
public interest.263 
6.2 Roach’s Models of Criminal Justice 
Development and criticism of Packer’s models264 can be found in the work of Roach.265  
Roach suggests that Packer’s models “may still strike a chord, but slowly and surely, they 
are becoming as out of date as other hits of the 1960’s.” 266  Roach suggests that Packer’s 
two models are inadequate in their nature as they no longer speak to the normalisation of 
the criminal process; are inflexible in their approach to new developments; and they fail to 
rationalise new empirical data which has surfaced since the 1960’s, such as victim rights, 
feminism, race issues and lack of victim reporting of crimes.   
Roach creates two further models of victims’ rights: one, the punitive model, which relies 
on criminal sanction and punishment; and secondly a non-punitive model which focusses 
on crime prevention and restorative justice.  The first, the punitive model, Roach describes 
as a ‘rollercoaster’.  Roach suggests this model has “linear orientation of the crime control 
and due process models as it moves towards trials, appeals, and punishments, but the ride 
is bumpier because of the well documented failure of the criminal sanction to control crime 
and respect victims and new political cases which put due process claims against victim’s 
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rights.”267  The non-punitive model is represented by a “circle which symbolizes successful 
crime prevention through family and community building and successful acts of restorative 
justice.”268  Roach suggests that the non-punitive model is more holistic and encapsulates a 
wider view of the causes and nature of the criminal offending.   
Roach, whilst promoting two additional models of criminal justice and suggesting a 
blended approach between the four models (Packer’s original, supplemented by his own 
two models), ultimately concludes that his and Packer’s models are doomed to failure: 
There is irony is my optimistic conclusion that non-punitive forms of victim’s 
rights could lead to less reliance on the criminal sanction.  Thirty-five years 
ago, Herbert Packer made the very same prediction about due process and 
much of this paper was devoted to explaining why he was wrong.  Due process 
has proven to be consistent with increased crime control as measured by 
expanding prison populations.  Seeing victims’ rights as a means to decrease 
reliance on the criminal sanction may be repeating Packer’s mistake, but in a 
much more obvious manner.  Victims’ rights could not only be consistent with 
increased crime control but could enable legitimate punitive outcomes much 
more directly that due process.  My pessimistic conclusion is that victims’ 
rights will continue as the new and improved face of crime control.269 
6.3 Walker’s Model of Criminal Justice 
Walker suggests that the model of justice to be applied in a criminal setting is that of a 
wedding cake. 270 The bottom tier of the cake represents the majority of the criminal 
offences dealt with by the system.   Offences in this category are generally dealt with by a 
financial penalty and may include low level anti-social behaviour and minor traffic 
offences.  The second tier of the cake is filled with lower-level offences which generally 
result in a plea to a reduced charge and are likely to end up with a financial penalty or 
lower end of the scale community pay back orders.  The third tier is made up of offences 
which are classed as serious offences, such as assault to injury or offenders with significant 
 
267 Roach (n 242). 
268 ibid. 
269 Ibid at 715. 
270 Samuel Walker, Sense and Nonsense About Crime and Drugs: A Policy Guide, Fourth Edition (4th Editio, 




prior convictions and are offences by persons who are likely to be sentenced to custody 
should they be convicted.  The top tier in the wedding cake analogy referred to by Walker 
as the “celebrated cases” are those which are the smallest part of the criminal justice 
system but are likely to be most featured in the media or attract the most severe form of 
punishment available in the criminal justice system.  Walker’s model is particularly useful 
in the context of understanding the problems facing the hidden nature of the criminal 
justice system.  The vast majority of the cases dealt with by COPFS are hidden in nature 
and little is understood of the system of case resolution and management.271   
Applying the wedding cake model alongside that of Packer and Roach, we can come to a 
synergy of the models of criminal justice - policy decisions are made via a mechanism of 
the models of justice (Packer and Roach) and applied by the public prosecutor in a system 
symbolised by the wedding cake. 
6.4 The Alternative System in Scotland and Models 
Having considered the models of Packer, Roach and Walker it becomes incumbent to 
consider how these models apply against the system of alternatives operating within the 
Scottish criminal justice system.   
Prior to the introduction of alternative disposals, the model in Scotland seems to fit 
squarely within Packer’s first model i.e., all offences must be processed through the 
criminal courts where it is in the public interest to do so.  The prosecution service must 
discharge the burden of proof and the accused’s rights are protected procedurally above all 
else.272 With the introduction of the alternative disposals, it may be argued that the Scottish 
system adopted the second of Packer’s Models in relation to the level of offences at the 
bottom of Walker’s wedding cake model.  As the system of alternatives developed, 
Packer’s second model became more prevalent in Scotland for offences within the first two 
tiers of Walker’s model. 273 
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Roach’s two additional models were incorporated into Scotland by the use of diversion 
from prosecution and expansion of community disposals in Scotland, rather than through 
the use of alternatives to prosecution.274 
It may be suggested that for the upper tiers of Walker’s wedding cake model, Scotland 
operates from Packer’s first model, the middle tiers of Walker operate between the first 
and second of Packer and the lower tiers operate distinctly. 
This suggestion, however, may be too simplistic in its nature.  It may be suggested that 
even cases proceeding under the first of Packer’s models in Scotland have been subject to 
influences of the first model.  Duff suggests that the adversarial system in Scotland has 
been introducing aspects of Packer’s second Model into the first by the duty to agree 
evidence, pre-trial hearings, and disclosure of evidence.275  It may be suggested that the 
operation of Packer’s first model in the top tier of offences is undermined by the operation 
of elements of his second model in the system which purports to operate from the first. 
6.5 Criminal Justice Systematic Practices 
Tata has suggested that the criminal justice system requires a “ritual individualization” to 
successfully operate.276 The actors within the criminal justice system must view themselves 
as upholding the fundamental principles of innocence, free choice of the accused and 
active participation in the case by providing an individualised service. This system of 
fundamental principles, Tata suggests, is potentially in conflict with the demands of the 
criminal justice system operating as a perfunctory mass case disposal system.   
‘Ritual individualization’ requires four key transitions in an accused person’s journey to 
enable the ritualisation and transformation of the person from accused to convicted and 
case disposed. The first is the personal story as their unique narrative is told, representing 
the person freely participating in the criminal justice system.  Second is the social 
circumstances of the accused being mitigated and minimised, with the third being 
ambiguous admissions of guilt transforming into full, free, and sincere admissions.  
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Finally, the accused is represented as an offender resigned to their punishment which is 
forthcoming.277  
The potential conflict for Tata is found in the actors’ role in the system.  They must 
convince themselves that they truly represent the fundamental principles of the justice 
system, but at the same time provide a service to a client which is unique and, on the 
surface, seems to represent their best interests at all times.   Tata further suggests that 
“Individualization work achieves case normalisation, thus managing the potential menace 
of ambiguous or seemingly defiant defendant postures.”278  
In the system of alternative disposals, anecdotal evidence suggests that they are imposed 
and accepted without an accused person seeking legal advice. In Scotland, it may be 
suggested that applying Tata’s theory to the system of alternatives also removes the 
potentially troublesome defence agent who seeks to throw obstacles in the form of rules of 
evidence, sufficiency, and legitimate defences in the way of the expeditious case disposal 
system.  It may be the case that the ‘ritual individualization’ theory could be applied in the 
normalisation of the presumption of guilt on the part of COPFS to offences whereby an 
alternative is offered, and the potential menace of a defiant accused is mitigated by only 
the vague possibility of them receiving legal advice or being influenced by the nature of 
the letter style which contains the offer of the alternative disposal.  Tata suggests that the 
“genius” of the ‘ritual individualization’ is that it achieves status change. 279    
It may be suggested that the “genius” of the alternative disposal system is the 
transformation of the accused to a convicted person with a disposed case, without the ritual 
of the criminal justice system. 
6.6 Criminal Justice Models in Scotland 
In Woolmington v DPP Viscount Sankey made his famous reference to the “Golden 
Thread” of the criminal justice system, being the presumption of innocence.280  It is 
suggested that the system of alternative disposals and the models of criminal justice in 
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Scotland, somewhat undermine this proposition.  Indeed, Tata suggests that ritual 
individualism is required so that the actors in the justice system can maintain their 
attachment to notions of justice without proof of the notions applying in reality or in 
practice beyond their pretence. 
The ritual individualism is applied to and by an accused, whereby they consider the 
criminal justice system and the path open to them in their particular circumstances.  Do 
they force COPFS to apply Packer’s first model of criminal justice and run the risk of a 
formal criminal conviction or accept an alternative and avoid this risk by payment of a sum 
of money or a time limited fiscal work order?  Does COPFS apply the model of Walker in 
the assessment of which tier the offence falls into and apply the alternatives to the bottom 
tier’s and by implication follow the second of Packer’s models?281 If the accused is 
ordained to appear before a court, do they use the informal mechanisms (plea 
bargaining)282 to tender a plea of guilty to a reduced charge and by this nature cross the 
boundary between Packer’s two models and bring themselves to the community restitution 
of Roach’s models? 
6.7 Conclusion 
It is the researcher’s conclusion that Scotland does not operate exclusively within Packer’s 
models, Roaches development of the models, Walkers tiers, nor any of the promulgated 
models to date.  
The reality of the situation, as far as this research has been able to establish, is that the 
Scottish system is a mosaic of criminal justice models. There are parts of the criminal 
justice system which operate primarily from Packer’s first model, with elements of the 
second, as suggested by Duff,283 while other aspects of the system operate solely from the 
second of Packer’s models with the constraints of the prosecutor’s tests.284  Roach’s 
diversion and rehabilitative model appears to operate within the alternative disposal system 
alongside the court disposals aimed at community rehabilitation. It appears that the 
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decision-making process broadly follows that of Walker’s tiers with the pathways open to 
the public prosecutor determined by the nature and features of the particular offence.285 
The researcher concludes that Scotland operates a ‘mosaic model’ of the previously 
promulgated models of criminal justice and has operated a selective modus operandi of 
blending the models into the current justice system as it operates. This ‘mosaic model’ is 
influenced by the operation of ritual individualism of the accused and the public prosecutor 
so that justice is done without the complexities of the formal criminal trial.  It is the 
researcher’s view that a balance must be struck between the development of the criminal 
justice system and a conscious decision-making process regarding the models of criminal 
justice which should be prevalent within Scotland.  Furthermore, engagement with the 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendations  
7.1 Conclusions 
This research was undertaken for the purposes of understanding the development, use 
and system of the alternative disposals in the criminal justice system, understanding any 
improvements which could be made to the Scottish system, whilst maintaining the 
integrity of the process and protection of the actors within the system.  During the 
course of the research, the researcher has drawn conclusions on the system in Scotland 
and sought where possible to outline a possible future direction for the development of 
alternative disposals in the Scottish criminal justice system. 
Alternatives can be used as a mechanism to reduce pressure on an overburdened court 
system and the economic impact of offending behaviour on a society where the offending 
behaviour per se does not require the imposition of a sentence in court.   
Since the system of alternatives was introduced in Scotland it has been developed, 
tweaked, and extended to where more than 46% of cases reported to COPFS are dealt 
with by use of an alternative.287  In the course of this research, it has become apparent 
that the areas identified in the Summary Justice Reform report288 have not been 
addressed in any tangible way.  This research highlights further areas of development in 
the Scottish system and highlights the urgent need for further research. 
The conclusions contained in this research are a result of the comparative study between 
the system of the Netherlands and Scotland.  The comparisons between Scotland and 
the Netherlands has allowed this research to offer opportunities for Scotland to develop 
its criminal justice system. Where it has not been possible to make a recommendation 
without qualification the recommendation is so qualified. 
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 Introduction of Statistical Analysis of the Effectiveness of Alternative 
Disposals 
This research has highlighted that there is little effective statistical analysis in the Scottish 
criminal justice system.289 There is no available analysis of the effectiveness of alternative 
disposals. There is no available evidence on the rehabilitative effects of alternative disposals 
or the effects of public confidence in the justice system by the use of these methods.  It is 
recommended that a robust system of the analysis of statistics and access to the criminal 
justice system for external researchers be established.  This analysis and access is required 
in order that effective decisions can be taken concerning crime reduction programs, 
rehabilitation and treatment programs, the socio-economic impact of changes and 
developments to the criminal justice system for the greater good of society.  
Fionda290 suggests that the apparent solution to the accountability problem is the reluctance 
to acknowledge the prosecutor’s role as a person imposing a criminal sanction when 
contrasted with the role in the Netherlands where this is publicly acknowledged.  Fionda 
further highlights that this contrasting role must be opened up to public scrutiny as without 
this accountability for the actual sentencing, the role is unlikely to develop.291 Given that the 
imposition of an alternative has been in place in Scotland for a considerable period, the 
research highlights areas of concern which require open, transparent accountability in the 
public interest. 
The continued use of the alternative disposal system, or indeed expansion of the alternative 
disposal system, without the corresponding creation of statistical analysis of the impact and 
effectiveness of the current and future methodologies, would be to accept that the 
introduction of such methods would be made solely from an economic perspective and 
without consideration of the broader aims of a criminal justice system. 
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The methods of arriving at the present systems in the Netherlands and Scotland have varied 
dramatically. If the idea of prosecutorial imposition of sanctions in Scotland is viewed as an 
overall societal good, then there is no reason why the system in Scotland should not seek to 
develop further, providing the appropriate safeguards are put in place.  A utilitarian 
approach, or managerialist approach, to the criminal justice system and the extent to which 
it can operate within a jurisdiction is a matter for the policymakers and the elected officials.  
Indeed, the operation of an expedient justice system which seeks to safeguard all rights of 
an accused person may in of itself be contradictory.292 These principles and policy decisions 
require to be balanced between the benefits of implementing them and the inherent risks 
which they pose.   
This research concludes that the balance in Scotland requires to be addressed whilst still 
maintaining the possibility of further developments of the current system. 
 Introduction of a publicly available marking system 
This research highlights that decisions of the COPFS in Scotland lack transparency.  COPFS 
is open to legitimate criticism of the statistical data available and the lack of scrutiny that it 
affords.293  Accordingly, it is recommended that Scotland should adopt a simplified, open 
and transparent system which is accessible to the public and gives the public confidence that 
all persons are treated equally before the law.  It is recommended that Scotland should 
develop a Polaris style system. 
By application of a similar system to that of the Netherlands of points application to each 
offence, aggravation, and mitigating factor the process of case marking and consideration by 
a prosecutor may be significantly streamlined.  It is thought that this may lead to a reduction 
in the number of unnecessary pleading diets in the Summary Sheriff Court system.   
A Polaris style system would allow each offence to be viewed on its objective facts with 
consideration of any aggravating or mitigating factors allowing for a more coherent, 
transparent system for both the accused and the prosecution service.  It may diminish any 
suggestion of disparity in prosecutorial decisions.  Naturally, any system will not have the 
ability to have all, and every circumstance automatically accounted for, thus there remains 
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the need for the professional to fall back on their experience where the particular or peculiar 
circumstances require this.  Further, any deviation from the marking guidelines would be 
recorded and require justification in determining the outcome and be subject to legitimate 
scrutiny. 
The researcher concludes that this may increase the speed of the decision-making process, 
bring clarity to the public of the decision-making process and in the long-term lead to a 
reduction in the cost of the manual case marking process. 
A standardised system would allow advice to be given to an accused person as to the likely 
outcome of a complaint/plea; manage the expectation of the victims of crime; allow policy 
decisions to be made at an early stage to escalate sentencing or to make rehabilitative 
decisions; and be open to scrutiny.   
It is recommended that an independent body be responsible for the creation of the marking 
system.  This independent body should be composed of a mix of the Judiciary, prosecution 
and defence solicitors, victim representatives and lay members.  These members should have 
the insight, experience, and procedural knowledge to develop a system which will be in 
accord with the traditions of the criminal justice system in Scotland. It is recommended that 
expert views on the determination of sentencing guidelines are included in the establishment 
of the body.  This body must have the respect and consultative methodology to breed trust 
into the system from its very beginnings through to the implementation of the system, 
ensuring that it is fit for purpose and shall stand the test of time. 
Furthermore, it is recommended that an independent point review system be put in place, so 
that should particular criminal offending trends be identified that the system has the 
flexibility to update the points system and escalate the management of particular types of 
offending should the need arise.  This process must, however, be open, transparent, and 
published so that it is open to legitimate scrutiny. 




It is the researcher’s view that considering the highlighted apparent inconsistency in the 
Scottish criminal justice system294 that the accused should be afforded the right to appeal to 
an administrative tribunal against a decision of the prosecutor. It is again recommended that 
the appeal system is based on written submissions only with the only appeal grounds being 
on the application of the recommended Polaris style system and any use of discretion.  
The appeal to an independent tribunal will introduce independence from the COPFS which 
has ultimately been considering appeals against their own decisions and will allow for a 
more transparent system in which the public could have real confidence.   
Trust and confidence in the justice system is a critical societal norm which must be 
maintained to ensure the continued support of the rule of law.  The right of appeal against 
the decision of the public prosecutor whilst perhaps an inventive step is a limited appeal on 
one of two grounds: (i) error in law in the application of the suggested Polaris system, (ii) 
improper use of discretion.   
 Victim Right of Appeal 
It is recommended that the system of victim review decisions be extended. Victims should 
have a right to appeal via an administrative tribunal against a decision of the prosecutor.  
It is recommended that this be an appeal system operating on written submissions only 
concerning the application of the Polaris style system and any use of discretion and its 
reasonableness.   
An appeal to an independent tribunal would allow for independence from the prosecution 
system, which ultimately has been considering appeals against their own decisions. This 
would allow for a more transparent system in which the public could have real confidence.   
This recommendation would open to scrutiny the current request to review a decision, 
allowing for greater transparency and independence from the prosecution service. The 
objectivity of the public prosecutor is far more likely to be preserved if there is a clear 
 




separation of roles between the prosecutor and the victim, rather than the quasi-
representative position as it stands in Scotland. 
If the legal system in Scotland is serious about better serving the victims of crime, then an 
open, transparent, and externally supervised process will allow for better engagement with 
the victims of crime and ensure that the victim code is updated to include the aforementioned 
provisions. 
The researcher recommends a limited right of appeal.  The appeal grounds being: (i) an error 
of law in the application of the recommended Polaris system and (ii) improper use of 
discretion.   
The constraints and monitoring of the proper use of discretion in Scots law is not unfamiliar 
territory for the Scots legal system.295  A modified system applying the prosecutorial 
decisions should be able to be achieved with further research and investment.  
The researcher having come to this restricted and limited development acknowledges that 
taking the research as a whole it is necessary for Scotland to widen its engagement with the 
victims of crime to improve the criminal justice system.  The findings of this research in 
respect of the impact and value felt by victims of crime in the Netherlands should not easily 
be dismissed.  This widening of engagement and development of the system will not be 
without an economic cost, this must be balanced against the identified need for development 
and the needs of the victims of crime. 
 Introduction of the Fiscal Punishment Order 
It is recommended that Scotland further explores the system of Punishment Orders for 
implementation into Scotland.  It is readily acknowledged that significant further research 
on the exact model is required prior to any introduction.296  
The disposals of Scottish cases for the period of 2010 to 2018 suggests that an average of 
15,588 cases which received community sentences could be disposed of using a fiscal 
punishment order and not proceed in a court-based setting.  In addition, an average of 53,622 
 
295 The process of Judicial Review is discussed in Chapter 5. 




cases would become eligible for disposal under the suggested system.  An average of 16,188 
cases which received other non-custodial sentences may also be appropriately dealt by a 
punishment order.   
Naturally not all of these cases would remain suitable for a fiscal punishment order a 
percentage will still require a criminal trial under the traditional model, for example where 
the accused refuses this alternative and elects for a trial or in the model rejects the disposal 
offered and seeks a judicially imposed sentence.  Given that only 15% of trials called in the 
Justice of the Peace Court and 17% of trials called in the Sheriff court in Scotland result in 
evidence being led in the trial, it is anticipated that this system may result in significant time 
and financial savings in the Justice of the Peace and Sheriff Courts.  This development may 
lead to reduced waiting times, improving memory evidence and ensuring that victims’ and 
accused persons’ experience of the Scottish justice system are improved. 
In the Netherlands, only 0.75% of all offers of disposal from the prosecutor are rejected, and 
an average of 1,520 cases per year elect for judicial intervention.  Given the differences in 
the number of reported criminal cases in Scotland and the Netherlands, it would be 
anticipated that these figures would be relatively similar.297 
The suggestion of introducing the power to COPFS to impose a sentence on an accused may 
initially appear alien.  However, COPFS is already imposing a criminal sanction and the 
alternatives in use in Scotland form “the official notification given to an individual by the 
competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence.”298   
The introduction of the fiscal punishment order should not occur without giving a full and 
detailed consideration to the implications of such a system.  Consideration to the 
controversies inherent within such a system and the concerns raised in this research and by 
others as to the safeguards required for such a system. 
The repercussion of maximised "efficiency" is that an increasing bulk of crime 
is now being addressed as a bureaucratic problem. Extending the fiscal's 
discretionary sentencing powers aggravates unease over the disparity endemic 
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to hidden decision making, and heightens concern for adequate levels of 
transparency within the justice system. The implications of these developments, 
and the doubt as to whether this "tier" is subject to sufficient safeguards.299 
It is further recommend that a period is established for legal advice to be offered to an 
accused prior to the imposition of the punishment order, similar to that of the Netherlands.300 
Whilst outwith the scope of this research, it must be considered that further development to 
the alternative disposal system in Scotland is required from an economic perspective, given 
the Presumption Against Short Periods of Imprisonment (Scotland) Order 2019, which 
extended the presumption against custodial sentences of less than 12 months. There is likely 
then to be a further increase in the coming years of financial penalties and community service 
orders being imposed by the expensive summary court procedure.   
7.3 Further Research 
Whilst the researcher has made recommendations based on the findings of this research, 
several areas require further research before any implementation of the recommendations 
could be taken forward. The researcher suggests that urgent further research is required 
into the operation of the alternatives system in Scotland.  The matters highlighted by this 
research concerning the rehabilitative methods and effectiveness of alternatives in the 
course of offender behaviour, development of the assessment reports in the diversion 
scheme into the alternatives system, improvement in the data available and recorded in 
Scotland and the operation of unconscious and sub-conscious bias in the decision-making 
processes should be given particular attention.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This research has examined the use of the alternatives to prosecution in Scotland from 
inception to the growth and development of the system in Scotland and has presented a 
comparative study of the system with that of the Netherlands.  The research offers an 
opportunity for a critical examination of the Scottish system and explored developments 
and learnings from the system of the Netherlands.  
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During this research, the world faced a significant health crisis with the outbreak of Covid-
19.  This has led to significant delays in the processing of criminal cases within the court 
system and perhaps increases the urgency with which developments to the alternative 
disposal system are required. 
 
This research has concluded that alternatives to prosecution are imperative in a rounded 
justice system but there are areas where the Scottish system can be developed.  The 
recommendations offer improvements to the current system in Scotland which allows 
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